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ABSTRACT 
 
 Product recalls are widely recognized as a manufacturer’s worst nightmare. They 
put the value generated by product innovation at risk. In my dissertation, I investigate 
the factors that determine the effects of product recalls on firm value and the contingent 
influence of product recalls on the effects of new product preannouncements on firm 
value.  
In the first essay, I examine the determinants of the short- and long-term effects 
of product recalls on firm value. The findings offer important insights. First, while brand 
advertising has a significantly negative effect on short-term abnormal returns to product 
recall announcement, but not in the long run, especially when the recall involves a large 
number of vehicles. Second, advertising is positively associated with long-term 
shareholder value to product recall announcements. Third, diligent response to the recall 
(post-recall preparation) also has a positive effect on long-term shareholder value. 
Finally, although the voluntary recall initiation strategy has a significantly negative 
effect on short-term abnormal returns to product recall announcement, it has 
significantly positive effect on long-term firm value. Thus, the results suggest that 
managers should advertise judiciously, prepare post-recall response diligently, and 
initiate recalls to mitigate the negative impact of the product-harm crises.  
In the second essay, I focus on the determinants of the effect of new product 
preannouncements on short-term shareholder value changes in an environment 
characterized by frequent product recalls. The findings indicate that product recalls 
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reduce the significant short-term abnormal financial returns from new product 
preannouncements. The results show that the product recalls can dampen the effect of 
new product innovativeness on the short-term abnormal returns to new product 
preannouncements. However, advertising spending during product recalls can attenuate 
the negative effects of product recall volume on short-term returns to new product 
preannouncements. The findings offer managers clear guidelines on when to 
preannounce new products and on how to manage advertising amid product recalls to 
realize greater financial value from new product preannouncements. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Companies increasingly face crises involving harm created by their products, 
ranging from defective automobile recalls, lead paint in toys, faulty medical devices, and 
contaminated food products, which often result in product recalls. Defective products 
may cause fatal injuries to consumers, destroy intangible value that the firm has 
carefully established over many years, foster market turbulence (i.e., the rate of change 
in the composition of customers and their preferences), lead to revenue losses, and a 
decrease in the market value of the firm. Firms are greatly concerned about potential 
negative consequences of their organizational error and the need to employ a timely, 
relevant, and appropriate reaction strategy.  
Unfortunately, prior research has only focused on studying the short-term effects 
of product recalls on firm value. However, we need a deeper understanding of the 
determinants of product recall announcements and asymmetries between short- and 
long-term effects of product recalls on firm value. Furthermore, companies invest 
heavily in innovation to introduce new products to the market. Although prior research 
suggests that the stock market reacts positively to announcements and 
preannouncements of new products, it is unclear if this is true in markets characterized 
by frequent product recalls. In this dissertation, I seek to fill this gap by examining these 
relationships.  
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In my first essay, I address the following research questions. (1) How do 
investors value a firm in the long-term after a product recall? (2) What are the 
determinants of such long-term effects? (3) How are they different from the 
determinants of short-term effects of product recall on firm value? (4) What are the 
effects of the interactions of the determinants on long-term effects? Drawing on 
marketing, finance, and management literature, I formulate a conceptual model of 
product recall determinants and relationship between product recalls and firm value. I 
then empirically test these relationships using both short-term abnormal returns analysis 
and long-term calendar-time portfolio analysis of 185 automobile product recalls during 
1997-2002.  
My findings offer novel and important insights on the proposed relationship and 
address important asymmetries between short- and long-term effects of product recalls 
on firm value. My results provide important contributions for both theoretical and 
managerial perspectives. From a theoretical stand point, the findings offer a broad 
understanding of factors that affect the relationship between product-harm crises and 
firm value. From a practitioner perspective, my results suggest that managers should 
advertise judiciously, prepare post-recall response diligently, and introduce new products 
to mitigate the long-run negative impact of the product-harm crises. 
In my second essay, I focus on the determinants of the effect of new product 
preannouncements on short-term shareholder value in an environment of frequent 
product recalls. Specifically, I examine the following three research questions: (1) Do 
the effects of new product preannouncements on firm value differ between high and low 
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product recall environments? (2) What factors explain the differential effects of new 
product preannouncements on firm value in a high recall environment over a low recall 
environment? (3) What is the moderating role of product recall volume on the 
relationships between the determinants of new product preannouncements and firm 
value? I answer these research questions by using the event study methodology in the 
context of automobile industry. I estimate my model based on the unique dataset of 247 
new product preannouncements assembled from multiple data sources during a 13-year 
time period. My results offer managers clear guidelines on when to preannounce new 
products and how to manage advertising amid product recalls to realize greater financial 
value from new product preannouncements. 
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CHAPTER II 
DETERMINANTS OF THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF PRODUCT RECALLS 
ON SHAREHOLDER VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
 
 
Companies increasingly face crises involving harm created by their products, 
resulting in product recalls. While prior research has studied the short-term effects of 
product recalls on firm value, I develop a conceptual framework and hypotheses 
primarily about the determinants of the long-term effects of product recalls on 
shareholder value. I empirically test the hypotheses using both short-term abnormal 
returns analysis and long-term calendar-time portfolio analysis of 185 automobile 
product recalls during 1997-2002. My findings offer novel and important insights. My 
results suggest that managers should advertise judiciously, prepare post-recall response 
diligently, and introduce new products to mitigate the long-run negative impact of the 
product-harm crises. 
 
Introduction 
Companies increasingly face product harm crises, resulting in recalls of related 
products. Such product recalls are frequent in industries such as automobiles, 
pharmaceuticals and food. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), there was an average of 122 recalls per firm in the automotive 
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industry during 1997-2010. For example, during 2009-2010, Toyota announced 17 
recalls (impacting 6.7 million vehicles) due to problems such as unintended acceleration, 
a sticky brake, and poor vehicle handling (Time 2010).  
Product recalls involve extensive short- and long-term costs to the recalling firm. 
The short-term costs include costs related to investigation, notification, suspended 
production, repairs and replacement of defective products (Bromiley and Marcus 1989). 
Investors typically anticipate such costs and their effects on the firm’s cash flow. These 
effects are reflected in the short-term returns to product recall announcements. For 
example, the market capitalization of Toyota declined by 8.8 percent on the day it 
announced the recall of two million vehicles (MarketWatch 2010). 
Importantly, in the long-run, product recalls may damage intangible assets, such 
as customer equity, brand equity, corporate reputation (Rhee and Haunschild 2006), and 
marketing effectiveness (Liu and Shankar 2013; van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 
2007). These damages can have a long-term impact on the firm’s cash flow and such 
impact may be difficult for investors to ascertain. Furthermore, investors may not be able 
to anticipate other long-term costs, such as potential future liability claims from 
consumers, unpredictable fines from regulatory authorities, and other unexpected 
marketing costs to recover from the crises. Table 1 summarizes the short-and long-term 
costs of product recalls. For instance, over several months in 2010, Toyota had to 
suspend vehicle production at as many as five manufacturing plants as it encountered 
mounting claims. Such long-term costs have important effects on a firm’s long-term 
shareholder value, in particular, in industries such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals 
 6 
 
 
that are characterized by frequent product recalls (Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 
2013; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). For example, 
the market capitalization of Ford decreased by 27.9 percent one year after it announced a 
recall of 13 million vehicles in 2000 (Reuters 2001). 
To mitigate potentially negative long-term effects and improve long-term 
shareholder value, firms can use strategic variables such as advertising, recall initiation, 
post-recall preparation, and new product announcement. Over time, these strategic 
variables provide additional information to consumers and investors about the firm’s 
belief in its product, the seriousness of the crisis, the firm’s efforts to rectify the product 
defect, and improvements in the quality of future products.  
Firms could use different types of advertising such as brand (e.g., Toyota) 
advertising, promotional (e.g., zero-percent finance) advertising, recalled model (e.g., 
Toyota Corolla) advertising, and non-recalled model (e.g., Toyota Camry, Toyota Sienna, 
Toyota Tundra) advertising. By understanding the effects of these different advertising 
types on firm value during recall, firms can determine which type of advertising to use 
when they face a product recall. 
Similarly, firms could voluntarily initiate a recall or perform the recall upon an 
order from the regulatory authority. Over the long-term, a voluntary recall might signal 
the firm’s commitment to fix the problem but also cause some investors to overreact to 
potential negative financial consequences. A better understanding of the long-term effect 
of recall initiation strategy on firm value can help firms make an appropriate decision on 
this issue.    
 7 
 
 
To rectify the defect(s) in the product recalled, firms engage in post-recall 
preparation process. Consumers and investors evaluate the firm’s recovery efforts over 
several months after the recall announcement. By knowing how these efforts affect 
shareholder response in the long-run, firms can allocate their resources to post-recall 
preparation efforts.           
Finally, to convince consumers and investors about improved product quality 
after recall, firms could announce the introduction of new products. A clear 
understanding of the effects of such announcements on the long-term returns to product 
recalls will enhance firms’ ability to manage the recall situation.      
While the short-term effects of such crises or recalls on firm value have been 
researched (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011), the long-
term effects of such recalls are not well understood. An exception is Liu and Shankar 
(2013), who investigate the dynamic effects of product recall on brand preference and 
market share; however, they do not investigate the long-term impact on firm value. 
Furthermore, the findings from extant literature may not adequately inform managerial 
strategies on how to improve long-term shareholder value.     
A key challenge in analyzing the effects of product recalls on long-term 
abnormal financial returns in industries characterized by frequent recall events is control 
for cross-correlations across the recall events over a long period. These cross-
correlations are the most severe form of dependence in measuring abnormal returns (e.g., 
Kolari and Pynnonen 2010; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999). Prior research has not 
examined the long-term effects of such correlated product recall events.    
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To fill this key gap in the literature, I examine the effects of product recalls on 
abnormal financial returns, mainly in the long-term. Important research questions in this 
regard are: (1) How do investors value a firm in the long-term after a product recall? (2) 
What are the determinants of such long-term effects? (3) How are they different from the 
determinants of short-term effects of product recall on firm value? (4) What are the 
effects of the interactions of the determinants on long-term effects? 
The answers to these questions are important from both theoretical and 
practitioner viewpoints. From a theoretical standpoint, it is important for researchers to 
understand the factors that affect the relationship between product-harm crises and long-
term firm value. Furthermore, indeed a better understanding of how these factors 
combine to enhance or diminish long-term firm value. From a practitioner perspective, 
managers require guidance on how to manipulate the factors under their control to 
minimize the negative impact of product recalls in the short- and the long-term. For 
example, they could benefit from knowing the conditions under which they should 
voluntarily initiate product recalls. Moreover, they need to decide when to undertake 
different types of advertising after a product recall. Furthermore, managers should know 
how worthwhile post-recall preparation efforts are. Finally, managers may want to know 
when to announce new products after a product recall.  
 I first develop hypotheses about the determinants of product recall effects on 
shareholder value changes primarily in the long-run. I then formulate models of short-
term and long-term abnormal stock returns. For the long-term returns, I use the calendar-
time portfolio model to account for correlated recall announcements, consistent with 
 9 
 
 
prior research (e.g., Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999; Mitchell and Stafford 2000; Sorescu, 
Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). I test these hypotheses using data from 185 product 
recalls in the automobile industry during 1997-2002.  
My results reveal novel and important insights. First, when the recall involves a 
large number of vehicles, brand advertising has a significant negative effect on short-
term abnormal returns to product recall announcement but has a significant positive 
effect on long-term abnormal returns. Second, when a firm voluntarily initiates a product 
recall, its brand (recalled model) advertising is negatively (positively) associated with 
long-term abnormal returns to product recall announcements. Third, a diligent response 
to the recall (post-recall preparation) together with each of brand advertising and 
promotional advertising also has a significant positive effect on long-term shareholder 
value. Finally, when the recall volume is high, the announcement of a new product has a 
significant positive effect on long-term firm value. My results suggest that managers 
should provide judicious advertising support, diligently engage in post-recall preparation, 
and introduce new products to mitigate the negative long-term impact of the product-
harm crises. 
Conceptual Development and Hypotheses 
I develop hypotheses about the effects of different determinants on abnormal 
financial returns to product-harm crises.1  A product-harm crisis is a negatively 
publicized incident involving defective or potentially dangerous products as claimed by 
government agencies, firms, and consumers (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Siomkos and 
                                                 
1 I provide an overview of the automobile industry’s product recall process in the Appendix. 
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Kurzbard 1994). Product-harm crises typically result in product recalls, so I focus on 
product recalls. 
As discussed earlier, product recalls involve short- and long-term costs. To the 
extent investors can immediately foresee the effects of these costs on the firm’s future 
cash flows, these effects are reflected in the short-run abnormal financial returns (Chen, 
Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Davidson and Worrell 1992; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). 
However, investors may not be able to anticipate some of the long-term costs of product 
recalls. For instance, as outlined earlier, over the many months in 2010, Toyota had to 
suspend vehicle production at as many as five manufacturing plants as it encountered 
mounting claims. 
Determinants of Short-term Abnormal Returns to Product-harm Crisis  
Investors will likely assess the financial consequences of a product recall based 
on the information they can glean from the recall announcement. In the case of corporate 
announcements (e.g., product recall announcement, new product announcement), stock 
market abnormal returns are an appropriate metric of short-term shareholder value 
because daily stock returns measured around the day of the announcement provide 
precise measurement of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner 2007; Srinivasan and 
Bharadwaj 2004). Efficient market theory argues that investors, as rational economic 
agents, can immediately update and evaluate the current and future performance of a 
firm by using all publicly available information about its activities. Thus, the stock price 
will reflect investor expectations of performance. In the case of a product recall, 
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investors’ perceptions of significant direct costs may diminish their expectations of 
future performance.   
Consistent with prior studies (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; MacKinlay 1997; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011), I include the 
following key determinants of abnormal returns: recall characteristics (e.g., recall 
volume, recall initiation strategy, product reliability) and firm characteristics (e.g., 
capital structure, product scope, R&D intensity, labor intensity, sales).2  In addition, I 
focus on a key strategic decision variable, namely, advertising spending.  
Because different advertising types can have different effects on the short-term 
and long-term returns to product recall, I examine the effects of four types of advertising 
expenditures: brand advertising, promotional advertising, recalled model advertising, 
and non-recalled model advertising, consistent with Liu and Shankar (2013).  
Brand advertising refers to advertising that features the brand and the firm and 
does not highlight any sub-brand or product model. Promotional advertising is 
informative advertising that communicates information about the brand’s promotional 
activities that deliver customer incentives, such as annual percentage rate (APR) 
financing, manufacturer rebates, and extended warranty. Recalled model advertising 
refers to advertising spent on all the sub-brands/nameplates that were recalled during the 
week of the product recall announcement. In contrast, non-recalled model advertising 
                                                 
2
 Recall severity may also affect short-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement. However, 
in the data I use in our subsequent empirical analysis, the variability in recall severity is low. Therefore, I 
exclude recall severity from my analysis.  
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captures the total sub-brand advertising spent on all sub-brands/nameplates that were not 
recalled.  
In developing the hypotheses, I focus on key interactions among these 
determinants such as those between a recall characteristic and a strategic decision 
variable. I begin with the interaction between recall volume and brand advertising.   
Recall Volume and Short-term Abnormal Returns: Moderating Role of Brand 
Advertising 
The focus of my essay is on the long-term effect of product recalls on 
shareholder value. Nevertheless, I first examine the combined effect of recall volume 
and brand advertising on the short-term returns to product recall so that I can 
subsequently compare this short-term effect with the long-term effect on which I focus.   
The impact of product recalls on short-term firm value may depend on the 
interaction between recall volume and brand advertising. Recall volume and brand 
advertising may individually impact brand equity and firm value in opposite directions. 
While recall volume negatively affects short-term shareholder value, brand advertising is 
a key marketing tool to arrest customer defection during the crisis (Cleeren, Dekimpe, 
and Helsen 2008; Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; van Heerde, Helsen, and 
Dekimpe 2007). 
A product recall event with a high volume can damage consumer trust in the 
brand and negatively impact brand equity (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Based on base-rate 
information (industry average), consumers and investors may attribute a high volume 
recall to the firm’s incompetence, punishing the firm in the short-run (Lei, Dawar, and 
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Gurhan-Canli 2012). In contrast, brand advertising generally raises brand awareness 
(Aaker 1996; Srinivasan et al. 2009), differentiates from competitor brands 
(Krishnamurthy 2000), and builds brand equity (Liu and Shankar 2013). Thus, by itself, 
brand advertising allows firms to increase cash flows and firm value.  
Recall volume and brand advertising may interact to affect short-term returns to a 
product recall. Investors may interpret brand advertising differently in the context of 
product harm crises. Under a product-harm crisis, the greater the negative information 
(or recall volume) about the brand, the more the consumers (and investors) question the 
credibility of brand advertising (Settle and Golden 1974). Furthermore, increased 
advertising will lead to greater visibility and salience of the recalled brands and firms in 
the marketplace, reducing advertising effectiveness (Sparkman and Locander 1980). 
Therefore, a heightened emphasis on brand advertising during a product harm crisis, 
combined with a high recall volume, will exacerbate the detrimental impact of product 
recalls on firm value in the short-term. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1. The negative relationship between product recall volume and 
short-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will be stronger 
for firms with higher levels of brand advertising than for firms with lower levels 
of brand advertising. 
Determinants of Long-term Abnormal Returns to Product-harm Crises 
Now I examine the determinants of the long-term effects of product recalls on 
firm value. Much research on product recalls focuses on short-term outcomes (e.g., Chen, 
Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). It is difficult to extend this event 
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window over a longer horizon when automakers experience frequent recalls. Using 
short-term abnormal returns to assess the financial consequences of product-harm crises 
would only be appropriate if I assume investors can fully anticipate the incremental cash 
flows and the associated risks of product recalls and have full information to forecast 
how the strategic decisions on product recalls will affect the firm’s future cash flows. 
However, it is unclear whether investors can anticipate the long-run costs and effects on 
shareholder value. Moreover, the initial negative reactions can be turned around over 
time with a systematic adjustment in the valuation of the impacted firm. Consequently, 
investors experience difficulty when correctly valuing the long-term effects of the firm’s 
strategic decisions regarding product recalls. In the following section, I develop 
hypotheses on the interactions between recall characteristics (recall volume and recall 
initiation strategy) and the post-crisis strategies (advertising spending, post-recall 
preparation, and new product announcements). 
Furthermore, contrary to the efficient market theory argument in the short-term, a 
large body of finance literature reveals that the market is slow to incorporate all 
available information about a firm, leading to a mispricing of the firm’s stock. This 
literature shows that managers make strategic decisions (e.g., new product 
preannouncement, R&D investment) to boost firm value when the firm’s stock is 
mispriced (Ikenberry and Ramnath 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 2004; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007).   
Recall Volume and Long-term Firm Value: Moderating Role of Brand Advertising 
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In contrast to the hypothesized short-term effect of recall volume and brand 
advertising on firm value, I argue that in the long-run, investors will react favorably to 
brand advertising under a severe crisis. I posit that a steady emphasis on brand 
advertising over a period of time will lead to the enhancement of intangible assets (e.g., 
brand equity), resulting in greater shareholder value. 
To assess the effect of recall volume and brand advertising on long-term 
shareholder value, investors will conjecture about the firm’s future outlook after a crisis 
based in part on the firm’s reaction to a major product recall. In general, brand 
advertising tends to have a positive long-term effect on firm performance (Joshi and 
Hanssens 2010). For instance, after the major recall incident in January 2010, Toyota 
substantially increased brand advertising to refurbish its tarnished image (Nielsen 2010). 
After months of brand advertising, Toyota’s sales levels began to approach pre-crisis 
levels. Therefore, unlike in the short-term, it is plausible that brand advertising will serve 
as a positive signal of future earnings potential in the long-term. 
Investors may perceive a big recall volume to be a major hit for the company. 
But at the same time, high levels of advertising over time increase the awareness of 
affected brand in the mind of consumers. If the firm continues to advertise the affected 
brand, investors may interpret it as a sign of firm’s trust in the brand; they may believe 
that the brand is strong enough to be recovered. Sustained advertising also signals to the 
customers and investors that the firm believes in the brand and will fix any product 
problems. In the long-term, the combined awareness that results over time from recall 
and strong brand advertising grows and the initial negative perceptions dwindle.  
 16 
 
 
Thus, brand advertising will likely positively moderate the relationship between 
recall volume and firm value in the long run. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between product recall volume and 
long-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will be weaker for 
firms with higher levels of brand advertising than for firms with lower levels of 
brand advertising. 
Recall Initiation Strategy and Long-term Value: Moderating Role of Advertising 
Spending 
Firms have a strategic recall initiation choice. They can either voluntarily initiate 
product recalls or wait for the regulatory authority to mandate the recall. On the one 
hand, firms responsible for the recall process may have high incentives to fulfill the 
product promise they made to investors and consumers, so by initiating the recall, they 
appear to be morally and socially responsive. Voluntary initiation also provides credible 
information about the firm’s commitment to investors in the long run. Indeed, financial 
analysts track firms with more socially responsible activities more often and provide 
them with more favorable investment recommendations than other firms (Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2010). 
On the other hand, investors may perceive a voluntary recall initiation as the 
firm’s admission of guilt about its product defects and its diminished future financial 
prospects. Indeed, investors penalize a voluntary recall initiation strategy in the short-
term (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009). This negative main effect relationship may extend 
over a longer period (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009). 
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I examine whether two types of advertising spending (brand advertising and 
recalled model advertising) after the recall announcement can alleviate or exacerbate the 
negative relationship between recall initiation strategy and long-term shareholder value. 
Attribution theory suggests that in the case of a brand voluntarily initiating the recall, 
consumers and investors perceive that the firm is attributing the recall to its own 
negligence (Settle and Golden 1974). When a firm attributes a problem with its brand to 
its own fault, brand advertising is less credible and less effective (Sparkman and 
Laconder 1980). Therefore, I argue that brand advertising will strengthen this negative 
relationship because it may not only make the affected brand salient, but it will also 
carry the negative image spillover to the brand’s sub-brands (Roehm and Tybout 2006). 
Subsequently, investors will adjust their assessment of the firm’s long-term value 
downward. 
In contrast, advertising the recalled-model, in conjunction with a proactive recall 
initiation strategy, may soften the negative impact of recall because investors will likely 
interpret recalled-model advertising as a remedy for the affected products. Thus, 
investors may adjust their assessment of the negative effect of product recall 
announcement on the long-run abnormal returns. Therefore, recalled-model advertising 
spending, together with a proactive recall initiation strategy, will lead to less negative 
long-term shareholder value. These arguments lead to my next two hypotheses as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship between product recall initiation 
strategy and long-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will 
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be stronger for firms with higher levels of brand advertising than for firms with 
lower levels of brand advertising. 
Hypothesis 4. The negative relationship between product recall initiation 
strategy and long-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will 
be weaker for firms with higher levels of recalled-model advertising than for 
firms with lower levels of recalled-model advertising. 
Effects of Interaction between Advertising Spending and Post-recall Preparation 
Firms need to successfully manage and complete the post-recall processes. Not 
much is known about the role of post-recall preparation in minimizing the possible long-
term negative impact of product recalls on firm value. A firm’s post-recall preparation 
refers to the extent of the firm’s efforts in addressing the crisis by appropriately 
mobilizing its resources (Shrivastava and Siomkos 1989). Addressing a product recall 
involves many tasks requiring considerable efforts and appropriate implementation. In 
the automobile product recall context, once a firm makes a recall announcement, it has 
to follow a process that includes several steps such as appropriately informing affected 
product owners, developing remedial procedures, distributing repair parts and kits, and 
training its dealers to repair the affected products (GAO 2011).  
In most cases, there is a time lag between the recall announcement date and the 
date the remedy is available to consumers regardless of the type of product recalls (see 
Appendix for a detailed write-up on the recall process). For example, it is possible to 
obtain an extension from the government agency in situations when the firm may need 
more preparation time (NHTSA 2006). In general, a long preparation time for the recall 
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procedures can reduce customer and investor uncertainty associated with the quality of 
repairs and proper completion of the recall process.  
As I argued previously, investors can update their knowledge about the 
completion of the recall process only during the period after the recall announcement 
date. As this newer information becomes available, the updated information may have a 
greater impact on firm value than other information. For example, if a firm responds to a 
recall by appropriately executing remedial procedures, the initial negative market 
reaction may decay over time. Post-recall preparation signals the execution ability of the 
recalling firm, so investors use the credible information from the post-recall processes 
over a period of time to make their assessment of long-term shareholder value. 
Investors’ assessment of the effect of a firm’s post-recall preparation on its long-
term shareholder value may depend on its brand advertising and promotional advertising 
after the recall. Brand advertising’s primary roles are to create awareness and develop 
positive attitudes toward the brand (Keller 2010). The performance of these roles is 
enhanced when brand advertising occurs with post-recall preparation efforts because 
together they evoke greater trust in the brand than when they act separately. Promotional 
advertising’s primary role is to improve the value of the product (Blattberg and Neslin 
1990). This role also becomes more effective in the presence of post-recall preparation 
because promotional advertising and post-recall preparation combine to improve the 
attractiveness of a product’s value.    
Thus, I expect the firm’s post-recall preparation efforts to strengthen the effects 
of post-recall brand advertising and promotional advertising on long-term returns to 
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product recall announcements. The credible information from high post-recall 
preparation efforts will enable investors to better forecast the firms’ future cash flows 
from increased brand and promotional advertising spending after product recall 
announcements over the long-term. Consequently, investors will likely revise their 
expectations of long-term returns upward. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5a. The positive relationship between brand advertising and long-
term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will be stronger for 
firms with higher levels of post-recall preparation than for firms with lower 
levels of post-recall preparation. 
Hypothesis 5b. The positive relationship between promotional advertising and 
long-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will be stronger 
for firms with levels of higher post-recall preparation than for firms with lower 
levels of post-recall preparation. 
Recall Volume and Long-term Firm Value: Moderating Role of New Product 
Announcements 
Firms introduce new products strategically to improve their performance. 
Typically, firms announce or preannounce the introduction of a new product to alert 
consumers and investors with positive news about the firm. Indeed, new product 
introductions and their preannouncements have a direct positive impact on long-term 
firm value (Pauwels et al. 2004; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). 
Importantly, positive information from new product announcements can 
attenuate the negative relationship between recall volume and long-term firm value. 
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Typically, a firm’s new product announcement signals the firm’s focus on a product with 
a superior quality and greater consumer benefits than those of its existing or recalled 
products. Although the announced new product may not necessarily replace the recalled 
product, a firm can signal the improved quality of its products through the new product 
announcement. In addition, in the long run, the number of new product announcements 
made after product recall announcements tends to provide positive news to investors and 
can negate the detrimental impact of recall volume on abnormal returns. Thus: 
Hypothesis 6. The negative relationship between product recall volume and 
long-term abnormal returns to a product recall announcement will be weaker for 
firms with a greater number of new product announcements than for firms with a 
fewer number of new product announcements. 
Empirical Context, Data, and Variable Operationalization 
I test the hypotheses in the United States (U.S.) automobile industry context. I 
carefully compiled the data for my empirical analysis from eight major sources: NHTSA 
for product recall attributes data, LexisNexis and Factiva databases for recall 
announcement date, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT 
for firm performance and firm attributes, Automotive News Market Data Book for auto 
vehicle sales, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook for auto characteristics, Kantar Media for 
weekly advertising spending, and Consumer Reports for product reliability. A summary 
of the operationalization of key variables and their data sources appears in Table 2. 
In the first step of the data collection, I identified the U.S. automobile industry’s 
largest six manufacturers listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) – General 
 22 
 
 
Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Nissan, Honda, and Toyota. These six car manufacturers 
represent approximately 87% of the total industry sales of passenger cars in the U.S. car 
market. I then collected the product recall data from the NHTSA database for these six 
automobile manufacturers during the period of January 1997 to December 2002, for 
which data were available. The NHTSA recall database is the official data source that 
provides information about the product defects in the automobile industry. It is the most 
reliable and valid data source for recent motor vehicle recall studies (e.g., Haunschild 
and Rhee 2004; Rhee and Haunschild 2006). During the period of my data, there were 
642 product recall events involving about 95 million vehicles in the automobile industry. 
The six firms included in this study experienced a total of 528 recalls over the data 
period, which represents 82.2% of the total product recalls, for an average of 14.67 
recalls per firm per year.  
Providing a true measure of the financial returns of an event requires 
sophisticated sample selection procedures to eliminate any potential confounding effects 
that may arise with the data collection process. For this essay, it is critical to identify the 
true date when the product recall was first announced to the public, allowing us to get a 
clean estimation window for event studies (see MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 
1997 for details). Although the NHTSA forms the key source of recall information on 
various recall characteristics, such as recall volume and recall initiation strategy, there is 
a time gap between the actual announcement date released to the public and the 
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notification date specified in the NHTSA database (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; 
Davidson and Worrell 1992).3 
Following previous studies (Sood and Tellis 2007), I searched all news sources 
available in LexisNexis and Factiva databases for the earliest date when information 
about the recall became publicly available. Because I consider the earliest signal to the 
market as the date of the announcement, this date corresponds to the date around which 
the short-term stock market response to the recall announcement occurs. Often in the 
automobile industry, the coverage of product recalls by the press release is not complete 
(Barber and Darrough 1996). Vehicle recalls occur more frequently than many other 
types of product recalls. Furthermore, the number of cars involved in each recall event 
may vary from hundreds to millions. Moreover, the recall can vary in its severity level 
(from a non-severe light bulb malfunction to a life-threatening brake failure). News 
organizations may pay attention to only the product recalls that involve both a 
reasonable number of vehicles and a significant safety related consequence. As a result, 
only a proportion of product recalls documented by NHTSA is reported as news releases 
to the public (Rupp and Taylor 2002). I obtained a usable sample of 185 product recall 
announcements made by the big six auto firms between 1997 and 2002, for an average 
of 5.29 recall announcements per firm per year.  
I obtained information on financial returns (daily/monthly) from the Center for 
Research on Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. The short- and long-
term abnormal-return metrics require the use of the four factors used in Carhart’s (1997) 
                                                 
3 Indeed, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Hoffer et al. 1988), I find that NHTSA’s notification dates 
have no impact on stock prices, indicating that these dates may not be the correct announcement dates. 
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model. I obtained data on these factors from Ken French’s Web site at Dartmouth 
College (see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library.html). 
I collected data on key firm characteristics, such as labor intensity, R&D intensity, 
capital structure, market-to-book ratio, and year trend from the COMPUSTAT database. 
I obtained information on monthly vehicle sales from the Automotive News Market Data 
Book, which aggregates sales of auto brands across the manufacturers. I procured data 
on product reliability from Consumer Reports, on the breadth and depth of products 
(product scope) offered by firms, and from the annual issues of Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbook on average car characteristics across each sub-brand, such as horsepower 
(HPW), size, weight, and segment. In addition, I obtained from Kantar Media (United 
States), weekly advertising expenditure data, which contain spending on brand 
advertising, model advertising, and promotional advertising. 
Variables, Measures and Models 
Focal Independent Variables 
 The purpose of the study is to investigate product recall’s effects on short- and 
long- term firm value and how firms can use recall initiation strategy, advertising 
spending, post-recall preparation and new product introduction announcements to 
alleviate the damage caused by product recalls. Thus, the key independent variables 
include recall attributes, advertising and new product announcements.  
Recall Attributes 
I include product recall volume or the volume of the defective vehicles to capture 
the magnitude of recall. To control for scale effects, I normalize the volume of product 
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recalls by the firm’s number of unit sales in the previous year (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, 
and Eilert 2013). I operationalize product recall initiation strategy by a binary variable 
that denotes whether the firm adopts a voluntary or an involuntary product recall 
initiation strategy. To measure the firm’s post-recall preparation time after the product 
recall announcement, I use the time lag between the recalling firm’s customer 
notification date from the NHTSA database and the actual recall announcement date. 
The longer this time is, the greater is the preparation to respond to the product recall. I 
measure post-recall preparation using a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the time lag is 
greater than or equal to the median value of time lag (33 days) and 0 if otherwise.  
New Product Announcements 
To account for potential information leakage of new product introductions, I use 
the public release of new product launch information as a proxy rather than the time of 
market launch (e.g., Ittner and Larcker 1997). I measure the number of new product 
announcements by the cumulative number of new product announcement press releases 
for six months after the product recall announcement. Furthermore, I include only 
products that were new to the firm or the market. 
Control Variables 
The control variables include product reliability, labor intensity, R&D intensity, 
sales, product scope, capital structure, market-to-book ratio, and year trend (Chen, 
Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011).  
I expect product reliability to positively influence abnormal returns to product 
recalls. I measure product reliability by the sales-weighted average of both the brand and 
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model level product reliability ratings from Consumer Reports, recorded as an integer on 
a 1-5 scale, consistent with prior research (Rhee and Haunschild 2006) (see Table 2 for 
details). 
 I expect the extent of labor use (measured by labor intensity) to affect the 
chances of a quality failure due to human causes (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). I control 
for the firm’s innovation (measured by R&D intensity) because the market’s assessment 
of a firm’s ability to overcome quality failure will be affected by the firm’s innovation 
orientation. The level of sales at the time of a product recall signals to investors the 
firm’s capabilities to fix the faulty product(s) and to recapture market share loss 
(Kalaignanam, Kushwaha,  and Eilert 2013; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). I measure sales 
at the monthly level from the Automotive News Market Data Book. Because product 
scope can have a positive effect on abnormal returns to recall announcements, I measure 
it by the breadth and depth of products, similar to how firm diversification and product 
scope are measured in the marketing and operation literatures (Sorescu, Chandy, and 
Prabhu 2003; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011), using data from the Automotive News Market 
Data Book as follows: 
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where E is Entropy, the measure of firm diversification, Pj is the number of vehicle 
models within brand j at time t, j=1, 2… n, n is the total number of brands, and P is the 
firm’s total number of vehicle models at time t.  
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Because shareholders’ burden of leveraged firms is lower than that of more 
conservatively financed firms, capital structure reflects the information investors have 
about the shareholders’ ability to overcome an increase in the risk posed by a product 
recall. I measure capital structure using the debt-to-equity ratio (Hendricks and Singhal 
2003; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). In addition, I include the market-to-book ratio to 
capture the firm’s growth prospects, which can impact the abnormal returns to the recall 
announcement (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). Finally, I include a time variable 
(Yeartrend) to capture the potential trends of the impact of product recalls on financial 
returns (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009). 
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix of key variables in the data 
appear in Table 3. The average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of a product recall 
announcement is negative at .005. The average recall involves about one quarter of a 
vehicle’s sales volume. On average, a firm initiates more than half the number of recall 
events. On average, firm spending on non-recalled model advertising is highest, 
followed by those on brand advertising, recalled model advertising, and promotional 
advertising, in that order. The median post-recall preparation time is 33 days.    
Short-term Effects Analysis 
To analyze the short-term effects of product recalls on firm value, I adopt the 
event study methodology. Computing short-term abnormal returns starts from defining 
the actual event window because I examine the abnormal returns over a relatively short 
period surrounding the event of interest (Brown and Warner 1985). Prior event study 
research has used various event windows, including a 2-day window (0, +1), a 3-day 
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window (-1, +1), a 6-day window (-1, +5), 11-day windows (-5, +5) (-10, +1) (-1, +10), 
and a 21-day window (-10, +10). I choose a relatively short event window (-1, +1) to 
minimize the potential confounding effects, consistent with prior research (Davidson and 
Worrell 1992; McWilliams and Siegel 1997).4  
I test the effects of the determinants on short-term abnormal returns using the 
following specification (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; MacKinlay 1997; Thirumalai and 
Shinha 2011): 
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where RECVOLi is the volume, RECSTRi is a dummy variable representing recall 
initiation strategy (=1 when it is a voluntary recall and 0 otherwise), PRODRELi is 
product reliability, BRDADVi is brand advertising, RCLADVi is recalled model 
advertising, NRCLADVi is non-recalled model advertising, PROMADVi is promotional 
advertising, LABINTi is labor intensity, RNDINTi is R&D intensity, SALESi is sales, 
PRODSCOPEi is product scope, CAPSTRi is capital structure, MTBi is market-to-book 
                                                 
4 To save space, I include the detailed steps to measure short-term abnormal returns in the Appendix A.  
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ratio, YEARi is year trend, all for product recall event i.
5 β is a parameter vector, η is a 
correction vector from the Control Function approach, and ξ is an error term.  
Because some of the variables (e.g., advertising) are endogenous, I estimate this 
model by controlling for endogeneity. Two ways to control for endogeneity are the 
Instrument Variable (IV) and the Control Function (CF) approaches. The IV approach 
may be inappropriate if there is a slope endogeneity problem (Garen 1984; Luan and 
Sudhir 2010). The slope endogeneity problem arises when manufacturers have private 
information about how investors might respond to advertising spending during the 
product recall. The CF approach is appropriate if there are potential intercept and slope 
endogeneity problems, which is the case in my model. Therefore, I use the CF approach. 
The CF approach can be estimated with cross-sectional or panel data at the aggregate 
level (Garen 1984). It is also flexible enough to account for multiple endogenous 
variables and advertising carryover effects (Liu and Shankar 2013; Luan and Sudhir 
2010). Unlike the IV approach that uses the predicted values of the endogenous variables, 
the CF approach uses the predicted residuals obtained from the first stage regression of 
the endogenous variables in the model. 
Long-term Effects Analysis 
The CAR metric is forward-looking in that it measures the firm’s strategic 
decisions not only during the time period surrounding an event window, but also during 
a future time horizon. However, using this measure for long-term returns is often 
challenged by questioning the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Extant research 
                                                 
5 Advertising spending is measured during the week of the event. 
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argues that investors may have behavioral biases when correctly evaluating stock prices, 
and therefore, need additional information to appropriately assess the mispricing of the 
firm’s strategic decisions made in the beginning of the recall process (e.g., Fama 1998). 
To account for the biases, two methods are commonly used when measuring long-term 
abnormal returns: the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and the Calendar Time 
Portfolio Abnormal Returns (CTAR).   
The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) has been widely used in the 
literature to study long-term stock returns. However, when there is considerable cross-
correlation of abnormal returns (or overlap), that is, when the long-term abnormal 
returns for subsets of the sample firms overlap in a common calendar period, measuring 
the correct statistical inferences of the event portfolio’s BHAR can be difficult. In 
particular, major corporate actions are not random events and they are clustered through 
time by industry. For example, in the automobile product recall context, manufacturers 
suffer from recurring events of product recalls instead of experiencing a one-time event, 
such as an initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Therefore, 
ignoring the cross-correlation problem may lead to a serious misspecification of the 
model (see Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999; Kothari and Warner 2007 for details). The 
Calendar Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns (CTAR) can control for the long-term 
effects of such correlated product recall events (e.g., Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 
2007) and is generally viewed as the most conservative method for measuring long-
horizon abnormal returns. It is particularly appropriate for calculating long-term 
abnormal returns to events that are clustered in time, automatically accounting for cross-
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sectional dependency among events such as product recalls in the U.S. automobile 
industry.  
In this essay, I test the effects of the determinants on long-term firm value by 
using the calendar-time portfolio approach, controlling for risk and momentum factors 
(Carhart 1997) as follows: 
,   (3)                 R R (R R )pt ft p p mt ft p t p t p t ptSMB HML UMD              
where Rpt is the rate of return of the calendar time portfolio p during month t, Rft is the 
risk-free rate that is the 1-month T-bill yield in month t, Rmt is the average rate return on 
the CRSP equal-weighted index in month t, SMBt is the return on a portfolio of small 
stocks minus the return on a portfolio of large stocks in month t, HMLt is the return on a 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-
market stocks in month t, UMDt is the return on a portfolio of high prior return stocks 
minus the return on a portfolio of low prior return stocks in month t, and εpt is the 
residual. The intercept (αp) reflects the average monthly abnormal returns of the 
portfolio. 
The CTAR analysis starts from portfolio formation and categorization of firms 
into various portfolios based on whether (1) the firm’s product recall volume was above 
or below the median value of the recall volume in that time period, (2) the firm’s product 
recall initiation strategy is either voluntary or involuntary, (3) the firm’s brand 
advertising spending is above or below the median value of eight weeks of cumulative 
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ad spending after the recall announcements,6 (4) the firm’s recalled model advertising 
spending is above or below the median value of eight weeks of cumulative ad spending, 
(5) the firm’s promotional advertising spending is above or below the median value of 
eight weeks of cumulative ad spending, (6) the firm’s post-recall preparation time is 
above or below the median value of preparation time after the product recall 
announcements, and (7) the firm’s total number of new product announcements is above 
or below the median value of the cumulative number of new product announcements six 
months after the product recall announcement. In addition, I rebalance the portfolios 
each month due to the frequent product recalls and changes in advertising spending in 
the automobile industry. 
Results 
Short-term Effects 
Table 4 shows the mean CAR for different event windows in the market model, 
the market-adjusted (three-factor) model, and the four-factor model. My results suggest 
that the CARs are negative and significant at the 5% significance level.  
Table 5 presents the results of the short-term returns cross-sectional analysis. I 
focus on the result relating to H1. The coefficient of the interaction of brand advertising 
and product recall volume is negative and significant (β = – 0.0171 and p < .10). This 
finding indicates that when recall volume is high, the recalling firm’s short-term 
                                                 
6 I performed additional analysis involving the negative effect of product recall on advertising 
effectiveness across different types of advertising. My results show that the negative impact of product 
recall lasts for about eight weeks for all types of advertising, suggesting that firms need at least eight 
weeks to recover to their original (pre-product recall) advertising effectiveness. 
 33 
 
 
abnormal returns are more negative when it spends more on brand advertising, 
supporting H1.  
In addition, control variables, product reliability, labor intensity, R&D intensity, 
sales, product scope, capital structure, market to book ratio, and year trend, do not have a 
significant (p > .10) effect on short-term abnormal returns, consistent with Chen, 
Ganesan, and Liu (2009). My finding implies that the market successfully prices the 
effects of these control firm and product characteristics.  
Long-term Effects 
I now present the results of the long-term calendar-time portfolio returns using 
the four-factor model. All stocks are included in the portfolios on the first trading day of 
the month following each event date and the compositions of portfolios vary throughout 
the holding period that ranges from six months to two years (see Sorescu, Shankar, and 
Kushwaha 2007). A summary of long-term effects results appears in Table 6. I discuss 
the interpretation of the results from the weighted least square (WLS) method that 
corrects for heteroscedasticity induced by changes in the number of firms in each 
calendar month. The calendar-time abnormal returns for the entire sample are significant 
for 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24 month holding periods, suggesting that financial returns to 
product recall announcements accrue over the long horizon. In fact, the alphas are fairly 
constant, ranging from 0.0072 to 0.0078, which implies that the monthly long-term 
abnormal returns are stable over the long-run in my full sample. My results indicate that 
the initial reaction of negative short-term abnormal returns to product recall 
announcements does not present a complete picture and that it takes a longer time to 
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reverse the initial negative, short-term valuation. These results appear in the first column 
of Table 6.  
To test H2, the interaction effect of brand advertising and product recall volume, 
I first assign firms and their events into four portfolios based on (1) the firm’s product 
recall volume and (2) the firm’s brand advertising spending based on the portfolio 
formation criteria outlined earlier. The results appear in the second column of Table 6. 
Although brand advertising negatively moderates the relationship between recall volume 
and short-term abnormal returns, I expected the effects of brand advertising to be viewed 
more positively by investors in the long run. My finding is consistent with H2 but 
opposite from the short-term effects. I find positive and significant annual abnormal 
returns of about 9% for the 6 to 24 months holding period (p < .001). This result shows 
that the firm’s investment on brand advertising after the product recall announcements 
sends favorable signals to investors in the long run.  
To test H3 and H4, the moderating effects of advertising spending on the 
relationship between product recall initiation strategy and long-term returns to product 
recall, I first assign firms and their events into four portfolios for each combination 
based on (1) the firm’s product recall initiation strategy, and (2) either the firm’s brand 
advertising spending or the firm’s recalled model advertising spending. The results 
appear in the third and fourth columns in Table 6. Consistent with H3, I find negative 
and statistically significant abnormal returns of about -2.6% across all holding periods (p 
< .001 or better). My results show that a firm’s high investment in brand advertising will 
intensify the negative impact of a proactive recall strategy on long-term firm value. In 
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contrast, according to H4, the effect on long-term firm value should be positive and 
significant. Higher spending on recalled model advertising in conjunction with a 
proactive recall initiation strategy will lead to greater returns. Indeed, I find significant 
positive annual abnormal returns of about 4.8% for all holding periods.  Firms with 
higher recalled model advertising support are more likely than firms with lower recalled 
model advertising to have higher long-term stock returns following a proactive recall 
initiation strategy.  
To test H5a and H5b, the moderating roles of post-recall preparation on the 
relationships between two types of advertising support and long-term stock returns, I 
form four portfolios for each combination based on the firm’s post-recall preparation, 
and the firm’s brand advertising spending or the firm’s promotional advertising spending. 
These results appear in the fifth to the sixth columns in Table 6. According to H5a and 
H5b, I should expect positive moderating effects of post-recall preparation. I observe 
positive and significant long-term abnormal returns of 3.5% (6.6%) for brand 
(promotional) advertising across all holding periods (p < .001). These results suggest 
that post-recall preparation has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between 
advertising support and long-term abnormal returns, supporting H5a and H5b.  
Finally, to test H6, the interaction between new product announcements and 
recall volume, I create four portfolios based on the firm’s total number of new product 
announcements and the firm’s product recall volume. The results appear in the last 
column of Table 6. I find positive and significant annual long-term abnormal returns of 
4.1% for all holding periods (p < .001). Consistent with H6, new product announcements 
 36 
 
 
after the recall announcement positively moderates the effect of product recall volume 
on long-term returns.  
I present a summary of the key results in Table 7. Brand advertising has a 
negative effect on short-term financial gains following high recall volume. However, 
brand advertising has a positive effect on long-term financial returns. The interaction 
effects of brand advertising and recalled model advertising with recall initiation strategy 
on long-term returns are asymmetric. Firms with higher brand advertising gain less in 
conjunction with voluntary product recalls. In contrast, firms with higher recalled model 
advertising together with a voluntary product recall strategy experience greater returns in 
the long run. Furthermore, post-recall preparation combined with advertising spending 
has a positive influence on long-term abnormal returns to product recalls. Finally, new 
product announcements together with high recall volume have a positive impact on long-
term returns to product recall announcements. 
Discussion and Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
This essay makes important contributions to the research on product-harm crises 
in several ways. First, I extend the product recall literature by examining and quantifying 
the long-term effects of product recalls on changes in shareholder value. I extend prior 
research on the determinants of the effects of product-harm crises on short-term 
abnormal returns (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Thirumalai and Shinha 2011) by 
identifying the determinants of long-term shareholder value. My results suggest that 
there are important differences between the short- and long-run effects of the 
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determinants on firm value. In particular, brand advertising has a negative effect on 
short-term abnormal returns, but a positive effect on long-term abnormal returns.  
Second, my study contributes to the literature by proposing a contingency framework 
and provides post-crisis recall strategies for each type of recall situation. In doing so, it 
advances marketing theory by identifying the key moderators of long-term abnormal 
returns to product recalls. Although conventional wisdom suggests that advertising 
support associated with product-harm crises should lead to positive shareholder returns, 
my findings suggest a nuanced conclusion. Firms could realize greater firm value 
through post-recall brand advertising support in the long run, but not in the short-run.  
Finally, my study extends our knowledge of product-harm crises and shareholder value 
by linking product-harm crises and new product introduction research streams. 
Innovation and new product introduction are positively associated with shareholder 
wealth creation. My results are consistent with this view, suggesting that new product 
introduction may serve as a new signaling mechanism, resulting in a positive direct 
effect on long-term shareholder value. Moreover, when firms are suffering from massive 
product recalls, investors are likely to expect more new product introductions, resulting 
in higher long-term returns.  
Managerial Implications 
The results have important managerial implications. Due to the increasing 
frequency of product recalls in recent years, managers need clear guidelines for 
successful product-harm crisis management. The results of this essay provide more 
complete substantive insights than prior studies. First, there is some merit in managers 
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choosing a passive recall initiation strategy to realize greater shareholder value in both 
the short- and the long-run. My results reveal significantly negative direct effects on 
shareholder value from voluntary product recalls in both the short- and the long-run. 
This reason might explain why Chrysler was reluctant to initiate a recall regarding 
potential engine fires in Jeep vehicles (USA Today 2013). 
Second, managers should invest in brand advertising over the long-term to create 
a buffer against negative incidents, especially for high volume recalls. For example, 
Toyota substantially increased brand advertising after the crisis to refurbish its tarnished 
image (Nielsen 2010). In a similar vein, managers who announce voluntary recalls are 
better off investing in recalled model advertising than brand advertising in the long run. 
However, in times of crises, they should avoid allocating marketing dollars to recalled 
model advertising. Therefore, over the long run, firms should have a strong focus on 
brand advertising in the case of mandated recalls and on recalled model advertising in 
the case of voluntary recalls.  
Third, in conjunction with advertising support, managers should focus on post-
recall preparation to remedy defects. After the recall announcement, they should expend 
efforts on the appropriate post-recall processes and focus on successfully eliminating the 
defects. Furthermore, firms with greater post-recall preparation efforts should focus 
more on promotional advertising than on brand advertising because promotional 
advertising in tandem with post-recall preparation allows managers to improve product 
value and induce a product purchase more than brand advertising does.   
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Finally, managers could use new product announcements to effectively manage a 
product-harm crisis situation. Firms with more new product announcements after recall 
announcements experience greater positive interaction effects on long-term firm value. 
This finding suggests that releasing new product information is critical to recovering 
from a crisis involving a product recall. Of course, a firm’s release of such information 
depends on its ability to create new products, some of which may have long 
development cycles. However, to the extent that new and improved models of existing 
products can be developed, managers should release such information after product 
recalls. This recommendation might explain why many firms in industries marked by 
technological and design upgrades announce multiple new products.   
Limitations, Further Research, and Conclusions 
Limitations and Further Research 
My research is not without limitations. First, the data are from one industry. 
Future research can extend the analysis to other industries to enhance the generalizability 
of results. Second, the focus of this essay is on abnormal returns to product recall 
announcements. Additional insights on the trade-off between product quality and 
innovation can be investigated by extending my research to study abnormal returns to 
new product preannouncements in the presence of product recalls.      
Conclusions 
Companies increasingly face product-harm crises and need to manage the long-
term effects of product recalls that result from such crises. Before this essay, not much 
was known about the determinants of the long-term effects of product recalls on firm 
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value. My empirical analysis of the short- and long-term effects of 185 automobile 
product recalls during 1997-2002 reveals novel and important insights. First, when recall 
volume is high, brand advertising has a significant negative effect on short-term 
abnormal returns to a product recall announcement but has a significant positive effect 
on firm value in the long run. Second, when a firm voluntarily initiates a product recall, 
its brand (recalled model) advertising is negatively (positively) associated with long-
term abnormal returns to product recall announcements. Third, a diligent response to the 
recall (post-recall preparation) together with each of brand advertising and promotional 
advertising also has a positive effect on long-term shareholder value. Finally, when the 
recall volume is high, the announcement of a new product has a significant positive 
effect on long-term firm value. Thus, my results suggest that managers should spend on 
advertising judiciously, prepare post-recall response diligently, and introduce new 
products to mitigate the negative impact of the product-harm crises. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEW PRODUCT PREANNOUNCEMENT AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN A 
FREQUENT PRODUCT RECALL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 Companies invest heavily in innovation to introduce new products to the market. 
Although prior research suggests that the stock market reacts positively to 
announcements and preannouncements of new products, it is unclear if this true in 
markets characterized by frequent product recalls. In this essay, I focus on the 
determinants of the effect of new product preannouncements on short-term shareholder 
value in such markets. I propose a conceptual model and empirically analyze using 
unique data of product recalls and new product preannouncements assembled from 
multiple data sources. My findings offer managers clear guidelines on when to 
preannounce new products and on how to manage advertising amid product recalls to 
realize greater financial value from new product preannouncements. 
 
Introduction 
Companies spend a large amount on innovation to generate new products for the 
marketplace. Product innovation is the new engine of growth (Terwiesch and Ulrich 
2009; Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin 2006). Innovation allows firm to raise the overall 
product quality and lower the cost of new products to satisfy customer needs. Moreover, 
strategic innovation can put a company in a sustainable leadership position. Thus, it is 
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assumed that most new product introductions would receive positive responses from the 
consumer and marketplace.  
Although prior research suggests a favorable reaction from the stock market for 
announcements and preannouncements of new products, it is unclear if this is true in 
markets characterized by frequent product recalls. Moreover, the findings from the 
innovation literature streams do not adequately inform managers on how to enhance the 
short-term abnormal returns to the product preannouncement in the presence of product-
harm crises. In this essay, I seek to describe situations in which new product 
preannouncements receive negative or non-significant market reaction. For example, the 
number of new product launches in the automobile industry has increased dramatically 
over years. While automakers are introducing new models every year, not all models 
receive a high level of attention from the marketplace. In addition, there are differences 
in the level of new product performance (Henard and Szymanski 2001). These 
incongruent findings make it difficult for managers and researchers to understand the 
success of new product preannouncements during a product-harm crisis. In light of these 
observations, I focus on the determinants of new product preannouncements on short-
term shareholder value changes in an environment characterized by frequent product 
recalls.  
My research fills a critical gap in the literature and addresses important research 
questions: 
• Do the effects of new product preannouncements on firm value differ between 
high and low product recall environments? 
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• What factors explain the differential effects of new product preannouncements 
on firm value in a high recall environment over a low recall environment?  
• What is the moderating role of product recall volume on the relationships 
between the determinants of new product preannouncements and firm value? 
To address these questions, I build on agency and signaling theories to formulate 
hypotheses about the determinants of new product preannouncements on firm value 
changes in the presence of a product-harm crisis. Then, I propose a conceptual model 
and empirically analyze a sample of 247 automobile new product preannouncements 
during a 13-year period (1997-2009).   
The answers to these questions are important from both theoretical and 
practitioner perspectives. From a theoretical standpoint, it is important for researchers to 
understand the trade-off between product quality and innovation by studying abnormal 
returns to new product preannouncements in the presence of product recalls. Moreover, 
researchers need a better understanding of how some factors strengthen or weaken short-
term firm value. From a practitioner perspective, managers could benefit from knowing 
the conditions under which they could manipulate such unpleasant situations. For 
example, to mitigate potentially negative effects due to a product recall, they should 
know when to use strategic variables when preannouncing new products, such as the 
new product’s innovativeness, advertising, technology specificity, recall recency, and 
recall initiation.   
My findings offer novel and important insights. First, firms should avoid 
preannouncing innovative new products if they are experiencing a high recall volume. 
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Second, firms should invest more on advertising after the crisis or during the new 
product introduction to mitigate any potentially negative effects. By understanding the 
effect of advertising on firm value, managers can determine the optimal time for 
advertising in the presence of product recalls. Also, my findings suggest that managers 
who are preparing to preannounce their new products should avoid rushing the launch 
process during the recall. 
This article proceeds as follows: First, I present my research hypotheses. Second, 
I describe the data and propose empirical models. Finally, I conclude by discussing 
limitations and managerial implications. 
Conceptual Development and Hypotheses 
In this section, I develop hypotheses about the effects of different determinants 
on abnormal stock returns to new product preannouncements. A new product 
preannouncement is a formal communication about the new product before it is 
officially introduced into the marketplace using strategic marketing actions (Eliashberg 
and Robertson 1988; Rao and Turut 2013). For example, Microsoft is famous for 
preannouncing their new products up to a year before the expected release date. Also, 
automobile firms frequently use international auto shows as an important venue to 
preannounce their new vehicle models about six months before the actual market release. 
During this time gap between the preannouncement date and the actual market 
introduction, a formal preannouncement made by firm may allow consumers, dealers, 
suppliers, and shareholders to form a positive association with the new product, which 
may lead to a successful market launch. Furthermore, a new product preannouncement 
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may influence their competitors’ future behavior (Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon 
1995; Bayus, Jain, and Rao 2001). 
To the extent investors can foresee the effects of new product preannouncements 
on the firm’s future cash flows, these effects are reflected in the short-term abnormal 
returns (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007; Chaney, Devinney and Winer 1991, 
Pauwels et al. 2004; Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson 2003). In general, firms’ new 
product preannouncements signal their intention to launch new products that offer 
improved product quality and consumer benefits over their current product offerings, 
resulting in a positive signal from investors. However, in some cases, investors may not 
be able to anticipate the consequences of preannouncements due to various reasons. First, 
delivering information about a new product may alert competitors, leading to greater 
competition; competitors may rush to introduce a rival product before the firm can 
introduce a preannounced product (Robertson et al. 1995). Second, the increasing 
prevalence of strategic new product moves by firms in several industries such as in the 
software, computer, automobile, and motion picture industries creates uncertainty 
associated with new product preannouncements. Thus, investors worry about whether a 
firm can deliver on its preannouncement promise (e.g., the vaporware phenomenon). 
Finally, firms may face an unexpected and unmanageable negative event (e.g., product 
recalls), although they have already planned to preannounce their new product. In this 
essay, I am particularly interested in the latter case where a firm needs to make a 
preannouncement during a product-harm crisis, which cannot be directly controlled by 
the firm. Since product-harm crises typically result in product recalls, this will be the 
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research focus. The following sections present relevant theory and the impact of product 
recalls on short-term abnormal returns to preannouncements. Table 8 shows illustrative 
research on the new product preannouncements on shareholder value. 
Determinants of Short-term Abnormal Returns to New Product Performance 
Main Effect of Recall Volume 
There is a large body of research on the effect of preannouncements on 
shareholder value changes, in the contexts of the innovativeness of new products, 
advertising support for other products, and technology specificity in the 
preannouncement. But not much is known about how all of these relationships coalesce 
in an environment of frequent product recalls.  
In the case of corporate announcements (e.g., new product preannouncement, 
product recall announcement), stock market abnormal returns are a particularly 
appropriate metric of financial performance, because they use daily stock returns 
measured around the day of the announcement. This will lead to a more precise 
measurement of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner 2007; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 
2004). The efficient market theory argues that investors as rational economic agents can 
immediately update and evaluate the current and future performance of a firm’s 
activities by using all publicly available information, which, in turn, will be reflected in 
the stock prices.  
Both agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992) and 
signaling theory (e.g., Heil and Robertson 1991; Kirmani and Rao 2000) provide a 
theoretical framework for exploring the impact of corporate announcements, such as 
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new product preannouncement and product recall announcements on investors’ 
evaluation of firm performance. In general, the stock market’s response has been 
measured as a metric of firm value resulting from financial information. Such financial 
information carries signals to key external stakeholders, which result in changes in firm 
value. In addition, investors (the principals) generally rely on the firm’s management 
(the agents) to ensure that the firm maintains a sustainable competitive advantage, 
thereby maximizing shareholder wealth. Therefore, the principals (investors) monitor 
how agents (managers) perform the contract with shareholders based on information 
about a firm’s decisions, such as new product introductions (e.g., Pauwels et al. 2004; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), brand extensions (Lane and Jacobson 1995), 
and announcements of product recall (e.g., Jerrell and Peltzman 1985; Chen et al. 2009; 
Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). 
Product recalls, or the severity of product recalls, have negative performance 
implications for the firm (Chen et al. 2009; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). Managers and 
investors are likely to speculate about the financial consequences of product recalls 
when releasing or obtaining recall information. In particular, investors will conjecture 
about the outlook of the product recall announcement based on some of the information 
about the recall event which can be a time-consuming task. Furthermore, product recalls 
are prone to last minute design changes , manufacturing process changes (i.e., suspended 
production), and discounted product value due to risk, which eventually leads to the 
delay of the new product’s introduction (Brown 2004). Since investors focus on the 
negative impact of the firm’s future cash flows and profitability, product recalls will act 
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as a negative signal during the true product development stage of a new product 
preannouncement.  In line with previous studies, I also assume that investors will 
perceive motor vehicle defects as a negative event, therefore, this will have a negative 
effect on the short-term abnormal returns to new product preannouncements. Thus:  
Hypothesis 1. The volume of product recalls prior to a new product 
preannouncement is negatively associated with the short-term abnormal returns 
to that preannouncement. 
Moderating Effects of Recall Volume 
 New Product Innovativeness and Short-term Abnormal Returns to NPP. 
The innovativeness, or relative advantage of new products, is a consistently important 
determinant of new product success (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Srinivasan et 
al. 2009). Products with high innovativeness engender numerous advantages. Such 
products are typically expected to receive positive stock returns, and this holds across 
many industries (e.g., high tech, automobile industries) (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 
1991; Pauwels et al. 2004; Sorescu, Chandy, Prabhu 2003). Also, highly innovative 
products outperform mediocre products in terms of their success in the 
commercialization phase (Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991).  
While the effect of innovation has a positive effect on stock market returns, , 
relatively less attention has been paid to the downside of innovativeness. According to 
Kirby (2010), investors can make an easier case for incremental innovations with major 
changes in the current version that are already successful than for more risky moves with 
long-term payoffs, because they are uncertain of demand for the preannouncements with 
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high innovativeness which is new to the firm. Investors interested in high margins focus 
on the disadvantages of increased costs and a reduced cash flow from a  new market 
entry, rather than the prospect of growth opportunities that entirely new products possess 
(Benner and Ranganathan 2013). Furthermore, a new product preannouncement is made 
with more uncertainty (i.e., farther ahead of the market release date), whereas a new 
product announcement is typically made with more certainty (i.e., closer to the actual 
market launch) (Koku, Jagpal, and Wiswananth 1997).  
The effect of new product innovativeness on short-term abnormal returns is also 
likely to depend on the product recalls. Product recall information conveys negative 
signals to investors about safety concerns on both existing and future products of the 
recalling firm. Since high innovativeness indicates higher uncertainty in quality and 
demand, investors and consumers can lose trust on the confidence of the preannouncing 
new product after a product recall. In the presence of product recalls, investors are likely 
to view the new product preannouncements with high innovativeness less favorably than 
preannouncements that are replacing the current model with a technological 
improvement. Therefore, higher innovativeness may lead to a lower return to a new 
product preannouncement due to a product recall. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between new product innovativeness and 
short-term abnormal returns to a new product preannouncement will be weaker 
for firms with high recall volume than for firms with low recall volume. 
Advertising and Short-term Abnormal Returns to NPP 
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The role of marketing investments (e.g., advertising) on the success of new 
products has been well examined in the literature on innovation (Yeoh and Roth 1999; 
Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003). Advertising spending is an essential component of 
new product success for building greater awareness and is particularly important for 
accelerating the adoption rate of new products (Srinivasan et al. 2009; Chen, Chiang, 
and Yang 2014;  Chandy and Tellis 2000). Furthermore, advertising generates greater 
cash flows for pioneers than for later entrants (e.g., Toyota Prius in the automobile 
industry) (Bowman and Gatignon 1996; Pauwels et al. 2004). Also, branding through 
advertising can reduce consumers’ perceived risk, particularly for radical innovation 
(Dowling and Staelin 1994).  
The effect of product recalls on short-term abnormal returns is also likely to 
depend on marketing investments after the product-harm crises (Yun, Liu, and Shankar 
2014). Often, advertising is the most frequently used marketing activity for recovering 
from a product-harm crisis (Cleeren et al. 2013). Firms also heavily spend on advertising 
prior to the new product introduction. Therefore, investors may view higher levels of 
advertising investments for defective products as evidence of brand confidence and as a 
potential improvement in future product quality. This will be associated with higher 
market value. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between advertising and short-term 
abnormal returns to a new product preannouncement will be stronger for firms 
with high recall volume than for firms with low recall volume. 
Technology Specificity and Short-term Abnormal Returns to NPP 
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The effect of new product preannouncements on short-term firm value vary 
across the types of information included in the preannouncement, such as 
preannouncement specificity (e.g., price, launch time), technology specificity (e.g., 
prototype and product demonstration, performance level), spokesperson (e.g., CEO, top 
executive), and financial evidence (Mishra and Bhabra 2001; Pompa, Waarts, and 
Wierenga 2003; Sorescu, Shankar, Kushwaha 2007).  New product preannouncements 
present an information asymmetry problem because the preannouncing new product is 
not yet available in the marketplace. Therefore, investors and the market look for signals 
from the content of a firm’s new product preannouncement. (Kirmani and Rao 2000; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). 
The effect of product recall volume on short-term abnormal returns is also likely 
to depend on the technology specificity of the preannouncing firm. Investors can view a 
firm’s product that has failed to meet safety standards as inferior to its rivals’. While 
information about a recall may convey negative signals to investors about safety 
concerns on the existing product line, new product preannouncements may offset this 
negative image by updating the current belief with the proof of an improved product 
quality and greater consumer benefits offered by the new product. As such, investors are 
likely to view the preannouncements of new products that contain technology-related 
information and greater improvement from the existing models more favorably than 
those of new products not containing technology-related information than its rivals 
during the product recalls. Thus, for high levels of technology specificity, I expect that 
the negative effect of product recall volume on short-term abnormal returns will be 
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attenuated by signaling technology specificity in the new product preannouncements. In 
summary, the greater the technology specificity, the more likely it is that product recalls 
of existing products will not carryover a negative signal onto the new product.  
Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between technology specificity and 
short-term abnormal returns to a new product preannouncement will be stronger 
for firms with high recall volume than for firms with low recall volume. 
Empirical Context, Data, and Variable Operationalization 
My data comes from eight major sources: LexisNexis database (for new product 
preannouncement and product recall announcement data), National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) (for product recall attributes data), Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT (for firm performance and firm attributes), 
Automotive News Market Data Book (for auto vehicle sales), Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbook (for auto vehicle characteristics), Kantar Media (for weekly advertising 
spending), and Consumer Report (for product reliability and technology specificity for 
new products).  
To empirically test the hypotheses, I compiled a unique dataset by collecting data 
on a number of key variables related to the new product preannouncement and product 
recall in the U.S. automobile industry. In order to avoid potential confounding effects, I 
searched all news sources available in the LexisNexis database for the earliest date when 
information about the new product preannouncement and product recall announcement 
became publicly available (see MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 1997 for 
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details). Because I consider the earliest signal to the market as the date of the 
announcement, this date corresponds to the date around which the short-term stock 
market response to the new product preannouncement occurs. After these careful data 
collection steps, my final sample for this essay consists of 247 new product 
preannouncements from publically traded U.S. automobile manufacturers listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) – General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Nissan, Honda, 
and Toyota between January 1997 and December 2009. Table 9 shows examples of new 
product preannouncements. 
Data about product recall attributes came from the NHTSA database which 
provides information about product defects for automobile manufacturers. NHTSA 
recall data is the official data source, and is viewed as the most reliable and valid data 
source for recent motor vehicle recall studies (e.g., Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Rhee and 
Haunschild 2006). I obtained recall characteristics from both the NHTSA database and 
the firm’s product recall announcements from the LexisNexis database. These include 
information on the recalled vehicle make and models, the firm’s recall initiation strategy, 
the volume of vehicle units to be recalled, recall severity, recall recency, and the filed 
date.  
I obtained information on financial returns (daily) from the Center for Research 
on Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Short-term abnormal-stock 
return metrics require the use of three risk factors proposed by Fama and French (1993), 
augmented with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. I obtained data on these four-factors 
from Ken French’s Web site at Dartmouth College (see 
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http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library.html). I collected 
information on preannouncement characteristics, such as technology specificity, 
spokesperson, preannouncement specificity, and targeting evidence from the actual 
preannouncement. I obtained key firm characteristics, such as R&D intensity, labor 
intensity, and firm size from the COMPUSTAT database. I obtained information on the 
monthly sales from the annual issues of the Automotive News Market Data Book, which 
aggregates sales of auto brands across manufacturers. I procured data on product 
reliability from the Consumer Report. I obtained vehicle segment information for new 
products, whether it is sport sedan, SUV/truck/van/wagon, hybrid, or luxury vehicle 
from the annual issues of Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. In addition, Kantar Media 
(United States) provided the weekly advertising expenditure data. Next, I present the 
method used to measure the short-term abnormal returns. Table 10 summarizes the 
operationalization of the dependent, key independent, and control variables, along with 
the data sources and references for each variable.  
Variables, Measures and Models 
Dependent Variable: Short-term Abnormal Stock Returns 
In examining the effects of new product preannouncements on short-term firm 
value, I adopt an event study methodology. The short-term horizon consists of a 
relatively short period around an event. Computing short-term abnormal returns starts 
with defining the actual event window, because the abnormal stock returns are examined 
over a relatively short period surrounding the event of interest (Brown and Warner 1985). 
Prior event study research has used various event windows, including a 1-day, 2-day, 3-
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day, and 6-day windows. In this essay, I present results using various event windows to 
measure the differences among the results of event windows. Among various event 
windows, I chose a relatively short event window (2-day window (-1; 0)) to minimize 
potential confounding effects or information leakage (McWilliams and Siegel 1997; 
Davidson and Worrell 1992). During each day in the event window, I compute abnormal 
returns as the difference between the realized (actual) stock returns and the expected 
stock return for the firm around the event date: 
 1(1)                                           AR R E R | ,it it it t    
where Rit is the daily stock return of firm i at time t and E[Rit|Ωt-1] is the expected stock 
returns of firm i at time t given the information set Ω available on day t-1. There are 
multiple options in the choice of a model for expected returns, such as the market model, 
the market-adjusted model, and the four-factor model. In the case of the market model, 
the expected return is given by 
 1 ˆˆ(2)                                           E R | R ,it t i i mt     
where Rmt is the average market returns based on a market index such as the S&P 500 at 
time t and αi and βi are firm specific factors that need to be estimated from an ordinary 
least squares regression of Rit on Rmt during the 120 trading days ending 31 days before 
the product recall announcement. In the case of the market-adjusted model, the expected 
return is given by 
 1(3)                                           E R | R ,it t mt   
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where Rmt is the average return of the entire stock market. Finally, in the case of the 
four-factor model, I follow the finance literature (e.g., Ang et al. 2006) using the Fama-
French (FF) three-factor model augmented with the momentum factor (Carhart 1997). 
The Carhart four-factor model is specified below (Fama and French 1993; 2006): 
(4)                   R R (R R ) ,it ft i i mt ft i t i t i t itSMB HML UMD              
where Rft is the risk-free rate, Rmt is the market return, SMBt is the difference in returns 
between small and large firms, HMLt is the difference in returns between high- and low-
value firms, UMDt ¬is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor that reflects the difference 
in the returns of firms with high and low prior stock performance (“up” minus “down”), 
and εit is the residual. Then, the mean abnormal returns on day t for the entire sample is 
estimated as 
1
1
(5)                                           AR AR .
N
it it
iN 
   
Abnormal returns are then estimated over a short period surrounding the event and are 
cumulated over the specified event window (time t = t1 to t2), resulting in one measure of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each event, given by 
2
1 2
1
( , )(6)                                           CAR AR .
t
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Key Independent Variables 
The innovativeness of a preannouncing new product could influence the financial 
returns to investors and shareholders (Pauwels et al. 2004; Srinivasan et al. 2009; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). It is conceivable that a higher level of 
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innovation would yield greater stock returns than preannounced products with a lower 
level of innovation (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003). To measure the innovativeness 
of preannounced new products, I follow the criteria from the JDPA’s expert rating on an 
automobile vehicle’s innovativeness. The innovativeness of a new vehicle model can be 
classified into a single item measure using a 0 to 5 scale, where 0 implies no visible 
vehicle change, 3 implies major changes that affect the exterior sheet metal and a 
considerable change to the interior, and 5 implies a new marketplace offering (e.g., 2001 
Acura MDX). Generally, minor changes in a model are not preannounced by firms, and 
the stock returns of these preannouncements are relatively low or have no impact on firm 
value. I only retain new product preannouncements that are equal or higher than level 3 
since this includes vehicles that are either significantly redesigned or are new 
introductions.  
I include the firm’s advertising efforts to capture firms’ efforts to facilitate the 
demand of the new or existing products, and at the same time to mitigate the negative 
effects of product recalls. The advertising variable is measured as the log of weekly 
advertising expenditure of the preannouncing automaker in thousands of dollars. I also 
include the product recall volume (i.e., the number of defective vehicles), to capture the 
extent of the recall volume and product adoption in the market. In order to account for 
scale effects, I normalize the volume of product recalls by the firm’s number of unit 
sales in the previous year (Kalaignanam et al. 2013).  
The content of a preannouncement can influence both investors and the market 
response. I operationalize technology specificity as a binary variable that takes the value 
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of 1 if the new product preannouncement contains information on the detailed 
technological improvement of the new product and 0 if otherwise. 
Additional Independent Variables 
In this essay, I follow how recent new product preannouncement and product 
recall studies operationalize the control variables in their study as a measure of product, 
firm, and industry characteristics, including recall recency, recall severity, recall 
initiation strategy, product reliability, sales, vehicle characteristics, and 
preannouncement characteristics, as preannouncement specificity, spokesperson, 
targeting evidence (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007; Chen et al. 2009; Thirumalai 
and Sinha 2011). I control for these variables to alleviate potential confounding effects 
on abnormal returns when examining the impact of new product preannouncements on 
short-term financial returns. 
I measure recall recency as the time lag between the firm's product recall 
announcement date and the firm's new product preannouncement date following the 
product recall announcement. It is conceivable that the abnormal returns for the new 
product preannouncement would be reduced when the preannouncement date is close to 
the product recall announcement date. Recall severity is a dummy variable denoting the 
recall type that increases the chance of a vehicle crash or consumer injury (Liu and 
Shankar 2014). I measure recall initiation strategy as a binary variable that denotes 
whether the firm adopts a voluntary product recall strategy or an involuntary product 
recall strategy. In addition, I also want to examine the impact of product reliability on 
short-term abnormal returns. For objective measures, I assess product reliability as a 
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variable using the average predicted reliability ratings from Consumer Reports, recorded 
as an integer on a scale of 1 to 5. To account for the impact of a preannouncing brand’s 
overall product reliability, I assess the product reliability as the sales-weighted average 
of the respective reliability ratings of the firm’s preannouncing brands. Since a well-
known brand is typically associated with better product quality, it can be presumed that 
the extent of perceived product quality will positively influence the abnormal returns for 
the new product preannouncements even in the presence of a product recall.  
Preannouncement specificity is defined as a binary variable that takes a value of 
1 if the preannouncement contains information on the price or time of the introduction of 
the new product and 0 if otherwise. Spokesperson is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the new product preannouncement was made by the chief executive officer or top 
management executive and 0 if otherwise (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). 
Finally, target evidence is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
preannouncement contains information on the potential target consumer or target market 
of the new product and 0 if otherwise.  
I also control for vehicle characteristics. I classify the new motor vehicles into 
several types based on the segment information. I classify sport sedan as a binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the preannouncing new product is a sport or two-door 
sedan and 0 if otherwise (Balachander, Liu, and Stock 2009); SUV/Truck/Van/Wagon is 
a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the preannouncing new product is a SUV, 
truck, van, or wagon model vehicle and 0 if otherwise; hybrid vehicle is a binary variable 
that takes a value of 1 if preannouncing new product is a hybrid vehicle and 0 if 
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otherwise; finally, luxury vehicle is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
preannouncing new product is luxury vehicle and 0 if otherwise (Balachander, Liu, and 
Stock 2009). 
The level of sales at the time of new product preannouncements signals to 
investors the firm’s competitive standpoint in the marketplace (Thirumalai and Sinha 
2011). Sales are measured as the log of monthly unit sales of the preannouncing 
automaker from the Automotive News Market Data Book. I include firm size to reflect 
the relative financial returns as a proportion of firm value. In line with previous literature, 
this is measured as the log of total asset from the COMPUSTAT database (Sorescu, 
Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). Finally, I include year fixed dummies to capture potential 
trends of the impact of new product preannouncements on firm value. Table 11 provides 
the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix.  
Following prior research (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007; MacKinlay 
1997), I test the effects of the determinants on short-term abnormal returns by using 
cross-sectional analyses around the new product preannouncement date. I test the effects 
of the determinants on short-term abnormal returns using the following specification: 
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Where CAR is the short-term abnormal return, VOLUMEit is the product recall volume 
prior to the new product preannouncement, INNVit is the innovativeness of the new 
product, ADVit(t-1) is the previous week’s total advertising spending, TECHit is 
technology specificity, INITIATIONi(t-1) is a dummy variable representing the recall 
initiation strategy (=1 when it is a voluntary recall and 0 otherwise), SEVERITYit is the 
severity of product recall, RECENCYit is the lag between the new product 
preannouncement date and the recall announcement date, RELIABit is product reliability, 
NPPSPECit is preannouncement specificity, TARGETit is targeting evidence, CEOit is 
spokesperson, 2DRit is sport sedan, SUVit is SUV, truck, van, or wagon vehicle type, 
HYBRIDit is hybrid vehicle type, LUXURYit is luxury vehicle type, SALESit is sales, 
SIZEit is firm size, and YEARi is a vector of (k-1) year dummies, for the new product 
preannouncement event i. β is a parameter vector, and ξ is an error term.  
 Because the advertising variable is endogenous, I estimate the model by 
controlling for endogeneity. To correct for this potential problem, I test my hypotheses 
by using the Instrument Variable (IV) approach. This ensures that my results from the 
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cross-sectional analyses provide a clear relationship between the determinants and firm 
financial performance of new product preannouncements. 
Results 
Main Results 
I conducted tests to assess the significance of the positive CARs for the new 
product preannouncements. Table 12 shows the mean CAR for different event windows 
in the market model, market-adjusted (three-factor) model, and four-factor model. Also, 
Table 12 presents the tests of significance of positive abnormal returns. Based on the 
results of the four-factor model, preannouncing firms realize about + 0.52 % returns in 
the [-1, 0] event window. My results show that the CARs are positive and highly 
significant (p < .01) for the new product preannouncements, consistent with previous 
research.  
Determinants of Short-term Effects 
Table 13 presents the results of the cross-sectional analysis that examines the 
determinants of short-term abnormal returns. This method supplements the previous 
event study results (MacKinlay 1997). As I presumed, the coefficient of the product 
recall is negative and significant (β = -.0012 p < .10). This indicates that, ceteris paribus, 
as the preannouncing firm experience a high volume of product recall, its short-term 
abnormal returns will be more negative, supporting H1. In other words, investors will 
interpret this as a negative signal for preannounced products with high recall volume. 
The coefficient of the interaction of innovativeness and product recall volume is 
negative and significant (β = -.0109 and p < .01). My result shows that the product recall 
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volume negatively moderates the relationship between the innovativeness of the new 
products and short-term abnormal returns for the new product preannouncements, 
supporting H2. Finally, the coefficient of the interaction of advertising and product recall 
volume is positive and statistically significant (β = .060 and p < .01). The result indicates 
that when recall volume is high, the preannouncing firm’s short-term abnormal returns 
are more positive when it spends more on advertising before the firm preannounces the 
new product, supporting H3. The result shows that the main effect of technology 
specificity significantly affect short-term firm value (β = .0134 and p < .01). However, 
the coefficient of the interaction of technology specificity and product recall volume is 
positive but not significant (β = .0041 and p > .10). However, its effect is in the positive 
direction as I presumed. 
In addition, among control variables, recall recency, recall initiation strategy, and 
spokesperson do have a significant (p < .05) effect on short-term abnormal returns, and 
the direction of coefficients were the same as I expected, except for the spokesperson. 
Other vehicle, preannouncement, and firm characteristics, such as product reliability, 
preannouncement specificity, targeting evidence, sales, firm size and vehicle segment 
information do not have a significant impact on short-term abnormal returns. I examined 
further checks to ensure that potential multicollinearity is not a concern from the last 
column of the cross-sectional analysis. The estimated variance inflation factor (VIF) 
scores were all less than 6, indicating no serious multicollinearity. Also, given that firms 
in the automotive industry experience multiple product recalls, I corrected for a possible 
clustered error structure and potential heteroskedasticity. In summary, my findings 
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suggest that the market reactions are less positive for firms with greater recall volume. 
Low innovativeness and high advertising expenditures under conditions of high recall 
volume, suspended preannouncement timing, and presence of technology specificity 
influence short-term abnormal returns for the new product preannouncement more 
positively.   
Discussion and Implications 
My study makes important contributions to the literature on innovation for theory 
and practice. I extend the existing knowledge on innovation and shareholder value by 
linking the new product preannouncement and product-harm crises research streams. In 
so doing, the results of this study can provide more substantive insights than prior 
studies. This essay suggests that product recalls have a negative effect on short-term 
abnormal returns. A few reasons could underlie this result. First, negative publicity due 
to product recalls may lower the market response of a preannounced new product. 
Second, investors have a negative view regarding recalled products offered by the firm. 
This negative view may carry over to a preannounced product, making investors 
question the quality of new product.  
The results also have some important managerial implications. Due to the 
increasing frequency of new product introductions and product recalls in recent years, 
managers need clear guidelines for strategic product management. Product-harm crises 
can have detrimental effects on a firm’s performance and on its very survival. When 
firms are experiencing a high volume of recalls, managers should avoid preannouncing 
their innovative new products. Furthermore, managers should invest more on advertising 
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before the preannouncement because this positively moderates the relationship between 
product recalls and short-term abnormal returns. Literature on product-harm crises has 
shown that advertising can help a firm overcome the crisis. Moreover, advertising can 
enhance the awareness and positive attitude toward the preannounced products.  
Managers should also emphasize the technological improvement in greater details in the 
new product preannouncement, but this should not delivered by an executive member of 
the firm. Managers should avoid preannouncing a new product right after the product 
recall incident. Finally, a proactive recall strategy can help firms realize greater short-
term abnormal returns.  
The goal of this essay is to present a more comprehensive picture showing how 
new product preannouncements in conjunction with product recalls negatively impact 
firm value.  Furthermore, I make a methodological contribution; I proposed model 
demonstrates a way to incorporate preannouncements with new product recalls in a 
tumultuous recall environment.    
Limitations, Further Research, and Conclusions 
Limitations and Further Research 
While my study contributes to the current knowledge of the benefits and 
consequences of firms’ innovation and new product preannouncements, it also suggests 
additional areas for future research. First, the analyses can be extended to examine the 
determinants of long-term shareholder value. Second, while I study the relationship from 
one industry, which enables us to develop a tight and robust set of results, it would also 
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be interesting to study the drivers of returns to preannouncements in the presence of 
product-harm crises in other industries to improve the generalizability of the results.  
Conclusions 
Companies are under increasing levels of pressure to generate innovative 
products.  As a result, managers need to successfully manage their new product 
introduction strategies. However, firms increasingly face product-harm crises, resulting 
in recalls of existing products. Such devastating costs have important effects on a firm’s 
shareholder value, in particular, in industries characterized by frequent new product 
launch and product recalls such as automobiles, food, and pharmaceuticals. Managers 
seek to maximize firm value when preannouncing their new product. Also, they seek to 
minimize the impact of a product-harm crisis. Ideally, they want to prevent negative 
spillover effects from a product-harm crisis from affecting their new product 
announcements. Before this study, little was known about the link between new product 
preannouncements and product-harm crises, and its impact on firm value. The empirical 
analysis of the short-term effects of 247 automobile preannouncements during 1997-
2009, reveals novel and important implications. First, when firms experience a large 
volume of product recalls, this has a significant negative effect on short-term abnormal 
returns to a new product preannouncement. Second, when the recall volume is high, 
preannouncing less innovative products can alleviate the negative effect on firm value. 
Third, when the recall volume is high, investing on advertising prior to the 
preannouncement can help attenuate the negative effect on firm value. Fourth, including 
technology related information of new products has a positive effect on the short-term 
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firm value to the new product preannouncements. Finally, delaying preannouncement 
from the recall incident also has a positive effect on short-term firm value. Thus, my 
study suggests that firms using appropriate responses to the crises may help accrue 
greater stock returns out of their new product preannouncements. The results of this 
study will enable managers and marketers to make better strategic product introduction 
decisions in a turbulent market environment.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Product recalls are the worst nightmare for many companies. In this dissertation, 
I provide insights by examining both determinants of product recalls and new product 
preannouncements in the presence of product recalls. My findings provide both 
academics and managers with a better understanding of product recalls in various 
situations.  
In my fist essay, I find that there are significant asymmetries between short-term 
and long-term effects of product recalls on firm value. I find that brand advertising has a 
significant negative effect on short-term abnormal returns to product recall 
announcement but has a significant positive effect on long-term abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, I find that a diligent response to the recall together with brand advertising 
and promotional advertising has a significant positive effect on long-term firm value. 
Finally, I find that the announcement of a new product increases long-term firm value 
when the recall volume is high. I expect that these findings will help managers of 
recalling firms to make better informed decisions when it comes to announcing a product 
recall.  
In my second essay, I study the effects of new product preannouncements on 
firm value in the presence of product recalls, which are overlooked by managers and 
academics. My findings extend the existing knowledge by linking the new product 
 69 
 
 
preannouncement and product-harm crises. I find that product recalls have negative 
effects on short-term firm value of new product preannouncements. I also find that 
investing on advertising before the preannouncement positively moderates the 
relationship between product recalls and short-term firm value. Furthermore, I provide 
evidence that emphasizing the technological improvement of new product in the 
preannouncement will help preannouncing firms mitigate the negative impact of product 
recalls on short-term firm value. Finally, I find that preannouncing the new product right 
after the product recall incident decreases firm value. These findings are particularly 
important for mangers who seek clear guidelines for strategic product management when 
they are about to make new product preannouncements in the presence of product recalls. 
I suggest that product recalls have a negative effect on short-term abnormal returns of 
new product preannouncements.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
The Recall Process in the Automobile Industry  
The automobile industry in the United States (U.S.) is one of the most highly 
regulated industries with regard to product safety. Given the important role of motor 
vehicles as a means of transportation in our daily life, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for requiring manufacturers to make 
certified products, monitoring the vehicles and equipment that consumers use on roads, 
and tracking the recall processes. NHTSA defines motor vehicle safety as, “the 
performance of a motor vehicle or equipment in a way that protects the public against 
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or 
performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an 
accident, and includes non-operational safety of a motor vehicle (NHTSA 2006).” It is 
triggered by quality failures including all possible cases of causing potential loss of 
vehicle control (e.g., sticky pedals, break flaws) or injury to people inside or outside of 
the vehicle (e.g., airbags malfunction, child safety seats).  
The product recall process starts with either the NHTSA or the firm receiving 
complaints or information from customers or dealers about suspected safety defects. If 
the NHTSA receives similar reports from a group of people about the same product, 
based on the number of reported complaints and the severity of the consequences, it 
might open an investigation on suspicious products for more a detailed analysis of the 
problem. Once an investigation is opened, it can be conducted in two phases-- the 
 83 
 
 
preliminary evaluation phase and the engineering analysis phase (NHTSA 2006). In both 
phases, the office of defects investigation (ODI) obtains from consumers, manufacturers, 
and suppliers data on crashes, injuries, warranty claims, and parts sales to decide if 
further analysis needs to be conducted.  A case under investigation can be closed either 
if the agency does not conclude a safety-related defect or if the manufacturer decides to 
initiate a voluntary product recall. Once the recall is initiated, the NHTSA records all 
safety recalls and monitors the process of recall execution until its completion. 
According to NHTSA reports, more than 390 million cars, trucks, buses, and 
motorcycles have been recalled to correct safety defects since 1966 (NHTSA 2006). 
During the recall process, the NHTSA is responsible for reviewing the planning 
and implementation of safety defect recalls provided by auto manufacturer. The NHTSA 
approves or requests changes to recall campaign plan based on information, such as: (1) 
a description of vehicles containing the safety defects (e.g., make, model year, date 
manufactured), (2) the number of unit affected, and (3) a description of manufacturer’s 
plan to remedy the defect through a recall campaign (e.g., recall notification letter, 
notifications to dealers, estimated time to be available to consumers). According to 
NHTSA’s report, NHTSA is pursuing a 60-day notification policy on all recall 
campaigns. However, the NHTSA tries to approve recall plan within a week (NHTSA 
2013).  
 The NHTSA evaluates the effectiveness of safety defect recalls based on the 
recall campaign's completion rate. It uses the data submitted by the manufacturers for 
each recall campaign case. The recalling automakers are required to report completion 
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rate data to NHTSA every quarter for six consecutive quarters (18 months, which is 
beyond our long-term window of 12 months) after the start of a recall campaign. 
However, recall completion rate for the first six months is only around (20-30) %. 
Importantly, it does not release these data to the public.  
According to GAO (2011), the average completion rate across all years and firms 
during 2000-2008 is about 65 %. This completion rate varies substantially by other 
factors, such as: (1) the owners’ perception of a safety defect, (2) the age and type of 
vehicle (old cars tend to have lower completion rates), and (3) the component recalled 
(e.g., brakes, fuel systems, cruise control). As such, these factors affecting completion 
rates are outside the NHTSA or the firm's control. For example, when vehicle owners 
read recall notices, they form their perceptions of the severity of a defect. According to 
GAO (2011), some manufacturers do not notify some dealerships even after recall 
notifications are sent to owners in a timely manner (e.g., within one week). In some 
cases, the recalled parts were not readily available when manufacturers notify owners of 
the recalls.  
In summary, given the recall process in the U.S. automobile industry, our 
measure of post-recall preparation is reasonable. Therefore, owners and investors can 
assess the firm’s efforts on the remedial procedures based on the time difference 
between recall announcement and notification date.   
Measurement of Short-term Abnormal Returns 
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During each day in the event window, we compute abnormal returns as the 
difference between the realized (actual) stock return and the expected stock return for the 
firm around the event date:  
 1   (A1)                                           AR R E R | ,it it it t    
where Rit is the daily stock return of firm i at time t and E[Rit|Ωt-1] is the expected stock 
return of firm i at time t given the information set Ω available on day t-1. There are 
different models for expected returns: the market model, the market-adjusted model, and 
the four-factor model. In the case of the market model, the expected return is given by: 
 1 ˆˆ   (A2)                                           E R | R ,it t i i mt     
where Rmt is the average market returns based on a market index such as the S&P 500 at 
time t and αi and βi are firm-specific factors that need to be estimated from an ordinary 
least squares regression of Rit on Rmt during the 120 trading days ending 31 days before 
the product recall announcement. In the case of the market-adjusted model, the expected 
return is given by 
 1   (A3)                                           E R | R ,it t mt   
where Rmt is the average return of the entire stock market. Finally, in the case of the 
four-factor model, we follow the finance literature (e.g., Ang et al. 2006) and use the 
Fama-French (FF) three-factor model augmented with the momentum factor (Carhart 
1997). The Carhart four-factor model is specified below (Fama and French 1993; 2006): 
   (A4)                   R R (R R ) ,it ft i i mt ft i t i t i t itSMB HML UMD              
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where Rft is the risk-free rate, Rmt is the market return, SMBt is the difference in returns 
between small and large firms, HMLt is the difference in returns between high- and low-
value firms, UMDt is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor that reflects the difference in 
the returns of firms with high and low prior stock performance (“up” minus “down”), 
and εit is the residual. Then, the mean abnormal returns on day t for the entire sample is 
estimated as:  
1
1
   (A5)                                           AR AR .
N
it it
iN 
   
 Then, the abnormal returns over a short period surrounding the event are estimated and 
cumulated over the specified event window (time t = t1 to t2), resulting in one measure of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each event, given by: 
2
1 2
1
( , )   (A6)                                           CAR AR .
t
iti t t
t t
  
Measurement of Long-term Abnormal Returns 
The BHAR is defined as, “the average multiyear return from a strategy of 
investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified 
holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms” 
(Mitchell and Stafford 2000, p. 296). Accordingly, the BHAR is computed by comparing 
the difference between the cumulative abnormal returns of a firm’s stock over a certain 
period of window (e.g., one year or more) and the cumulative abnormal returns of a 
benchmark of stocks whose risk adjustment factors are closely matched to those of the 
testing firm over the same period, such as stocks with similar size, book-to-market, and 
momentum (Dionysiou 2013; Kothari and Warner 2007). Although it has been widely 
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used in the literature, the method has some limitations that need to be accommodated. 
Measuring the correct statistical inferences of the event portfolio’s BHAR has been 
difficult because of considerable cross-correlation of abnormal returns (or overlap). This 
is mainly because the long-term abnormal returns for subsets of the sample firms are 
likely to overlap a common calendar period. In particular, major corporate actions are 
not random events, and those events cluster through time by industry. For example, in 
the automobile product recall context, manufacturers are more likely to suffer from 
recurring events of product recalls instead of experiencing a one-time event, such as an 
initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Therefore, ignoring the 
cross-correlation problem may lead to a serious misspecification of the test (See 
Dionysiou 2013; Kothari and Warner 2007 for details).  
One remedy to the cross-correlation issue is the Calendar Time Portfolio 
Abnormal Returns (CTAR) approach (see Fama 1998; Mitchell and Stafford 2000; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007 for details). This approach is viewed as the most 
conservative method for measuring long-horizon abnormal returns. It is particularly 
appropriate for calculating long-term abnormal returns to events that are clustered in 
time, automatically accounting for cross-sectional dependency among events such as 
product recalls in the U.S. automobile industry. In the marketing literature, the CTAR 
has been used to assess the long-term stock market valuation of new product 
preannouncements (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), customer satisfaction 
(Aksoy et al. 2008) and corporate branding strategies (Mizik, Knowles, and Dinner 
2011). Computing the CTAR starts with the creation of multiple portfolios of securities 
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based on common characteristics such as common events or corporate strategies. We can 
estimate the monthly returns of the resulting portfolios by the market model, the market-
adjusted model, or the model with risk adjustment factors. Finally, we can test for the 
significance of the intercept – or “alpha” – in the specified model for various time 
periods ranging from several months to years. Using the Fama-French (FF) three-factor 
model augmented with the Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor, the four-factor model is: 
   (A7)                R R (R R )pt ft p p mt ft p t p t p t ptSMB HML UMD              
However, the CTAR is not without limitations. Unlike the BHAR metric, it does 
not provide separate measures of abnormal returns for each event or firm. Instead, it can 
only be calculated at a portfolio level, which is a single measure of abnormal returns for 
each subsample (or portfolio). As such, researchers need to measure a separate abnormal 
return for each portfolio based on the common characteristics of events or corporate 
strategies. Furthermore, it is impractical to use more than three independent variables 
due to the increasing number of sub-portfolios that result from reducing the number of 
observations in each group (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). To test statistical 
inferences of the independent variable of interest, researchers can determine the effect of 
the independent variable on the long-term abnormal returns by comparing the intercepts 
(or alphas) from various portfolios. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TABLE 1. Product-harm Crisis Related Costs  
 
Short-term Long-term 
    
Investigation costs Unanticipated consumer liability claims 
Labor costs Unpredictable regulatory fines 
Suspended production and idle plant costs Unexpected marketing recovery costs 
Notification costs Uncertain decrease in marketing effectiveness 
Repair costs Unpredictable loss due to corporate reputation dilution 
Replacement costs 
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TABLE 2. Variables, Operationalization, and Data Sources  
 
Variable Reference Operationalization Data Source 
Dependent Variables 
   
Financial returns 
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009); 
Thirumalai and Shinha (2011) 
Short-term abnormal returns one day before and one day after the product recall 
announcement date 
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 
(2007) 
Long-term calendar-time portfolio-level returns (after the announcement) 
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
 
Fama and French (1993); Carhart 
(1997) 
Fama and French’s (1993) and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factors Ken French’s Web site 
Focal Independent Variables 
   
Product recall volume 
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009); 
Thirumalai and Shinha (2011) 
The number of units recalled normalized for the number of unit sales by the firm in the 
previous year 
NHTSA, LexisNexis, 
Automotive News 
Market Data Book 
Product recall initiation strategy Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009) 
1 if firms initiate voluntary product recall and 0 if the recall was mandated by the 
government agency 
NHTSA, LexisNexis 
Brand advertising Liu and Shankar (2013) Log of weekly expenditures on brand level advertising  Kantar Media 
Recalled model advertising Liu and Shankar (2013) Log of weekly expenditures on recalled model level advertising Kantar Media 
Non-recalled model advertising Liu and Shankar (2013) Log of weekly expenditures on non-recalled model level advertising Kantar Media 
Promotional advertising Liu and Shankar (2013) Log of weekly expenditures on promotional advertising  Kantar Media 
Post-recall preparation This study 
1 if the time lag between the firm's notification date to customers and actual recall 
announcement date is greater than or equal to the median value of time lag in the sample, 0 
if otherwise 
NHTSA, LexisNexis 
New product announcements This study 
Cumulative number of new product announcements made by firm in the six months after 
the product recall announcement  
LexisNexis, Factiva, 
Automotive News 
Market Data Book 
Control Variables 
   
Product reliability 
Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 
(2013); Liu and Shankar (2013) 
Unit sales-weighted average of brand reliability ratings + unit sales-weighted average of 
reliability ratings of the recalled-models 
Consumer Reports, 
Automotive News 
Market Data Book 
Labor intensity Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) Number of employees / sales revenues COMPUSTAT 
R&D intensity Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) R&D expenditures  / sales revenues COMPUSTAT 
Sales 
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011);            
Kalaignanam et al. (2013) 
Log of unit sales  
Automotive News 
Market Data Book 
Product scope 
Sorescu et al. (2003);                           
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) 
 
where Pj is the number of vehicle models within brand j, j=1, 2… n, and P is the 
firm’s total number of vehicle models 
 
Ward's Automotive 
Yearbook 
Capital structure Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) Debt-to-equity ratio: Long-term debt / shareholder equity COMPUSTAT 
Market to book ratio Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) Total number of shares outstanding times the stock price at quarter-end / common equity COMPUSTAT 
Year trend Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009) The number of years between 1997 and the year when the recall occurred COMPUSTAT 
1 1
ln   ln ,
n n
j
j
j jj j
P P P
P P
P P P 
    
            
 
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TABLE 3. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  
Variable M SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. CAR (-1; 1) -0.005 0.034 -0.159 0.106 1 
            
   2. Product recall volume 0.272 0.385 0.00001 2.092 -
0.11 
1 
           
   3. Product recall initiation 
strategy 
0.584 0.494 0 1 
-
0.13 
-0.33 1 
          
   4. Brand advertising 8.422 1.14 4.424 10.442 0.12 -0.06 -
0.15 
1 
         
   5. Recalled model advertising 5.842 1.141 3.212 8.228 -
0.17 
-0.22 0.37 -0.21 1 
        
   6. Non-recalled model 
advertising 
9.755 0.774 6.679 11.125 0.08 -0.09 
-
0.12 
0.45 -0.1 1 
       
   7. Promotional advertising 5.484 2.385 0 9.19 0.1 -0.06 -
0.11 
0.22 
-
0.28 
0.4 1 
      
   8. Post-recall preparation 0.514 0.501 0 1 -
0.01 
0.06 
-
0.25 
0.11 
-
0.09 
0.04 
-
0.07 
1 
     
   9. Product reliability 2.997 0.932 1.333 5 -
0.01 
-0.02 0.24 -0.51 0.42 
-
0.56 
-
0.34 
-
0.23 
1 
    
   10. Labor intensity 0.272 0.084 0.076 0.551 0.08 0.09 -0.2 0.002 -
0.36 
0.11 0.28 0.06 
-
0.34 
1 
   
   11. R&D intensity 0.284 0.134 0.13 0.827 -
0.09 
0.2 0.03 -0.52 0.22 
-
0.48 
-
0.15 
-
0.05 
0.59 
-
0.15 
1 
  
   12. Sales 14.018 0.59 12.906 14.767 0.15 -0.22 -
0.13 
0.42 
-
0.47 
0.63 0.46 0.08 
-
0.54 
0.23 
-
0.56 
1 
 
   13. Product scope 26.12 17.873 4.159 64.128 0.13 -0.19 -
0.17 
0.45 
-
0.51 
0.62 0.35 0.16 
-
0.57 
0.34 -0.5 0.9 1 
 
  14. Capital structure 0.266 0.062 0.052 0.56 0.03 0.001 -
0.07 
0.38 
-
0.28 
0.43 0.12 0.08 
-
0.48 
0.05 
-
0.37 
0.45 0.5 1 
  15. Market to book ratio 1.195 0.309 0.847 3.138 0.06 0.23 -
0.09 
-0.28 0.03 
-
0.22 
0.11 
-
0.16 
0.51 
-
0.15 
0.45 
-
0.24 
-0.3 
-
0.37 
1 
 
16. Year trend 2.611 1.751 0 5 
-
0.08 
-0.1 0.15 0.38 0.27 0.03 
-
0.08 
-
0.09 
-
0.13 
-
0.24 
-
0.27 
-
0.03 
-
0.09 
0.05 
-
0.26 
1 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4. Results of Short-Term Abnormal Returns Model  
 
  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Market Model 
Market-adjusted 
Model 
Four-factor Model 
    
Holding Period (n=185) (n=185) (n=185) 
[0; 1] Window -0.0056 -0.0068 -0.0042 
Positive: Negative 77:108 72:113 83:102 
CDA t -2.233** -2.648*** -1.821** 
Generalized Z -1.531* -2.246** -0.852 
[-1; 1] Window -0.0077 -0.0094 -0.0063 
Positive: Negative 78:107 78:107 79:106 
CDA t -2.526*** -2.695*** -2.248** 
Generalized Z -1.236 -1.360* -1.442* 
[-1; 5] Window -0.0085 -0.0126 -0.0076 
Positive: Negative 80:105 80:105 87:98 
CDA t -1.809** -2.617*** -1.771** 
Generalized Z -0.941 -1.065 -0.262 
[-10; 1] Window -0.0089 -0.0140 -0.0062 
Positive: Negative 88:97 85:100 87:98 
CDA t -1.452* -2.213** -1.108 
Generalized Z -0.203 -0.327 -0.262 
[-1; 10] Window -0.0099 -0.0167 -0.0084 
Positive: Negative 82:103 76:109 83:102 
CDA t -1.622* -2.641*** -1.502* 
Generalized Z -0.646 -1.655** -0.852 
[-10; 10] Window -0.0111 -0.0213 -0.0084 
Positive: Negative 85:100 76:109 83:102 
CDA t -1.368* -2.549*** -1.124 
Generalized Z -0.056 -1.655** -0.852 
Notes: This table shows the average cumulative returns and test statistics for various windows 
around the product recall announcement. The sample consists of 185 product recall 
announcements of six firms from 1997 to 2002. 
*** Denotes one-tail t-test significance at the 1% level;  
** Denotes one-tail t-test significance at the 5% level; 
* Denotes one-tail t-test significance at 10% level. 
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TABLE 5. Cross-Sectional Short-Term Abnormal Returns Around Product Recall 
Announcement Date 
 
  Final Model (Control Function 
Approach) 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Intercept -0.0497 (0.222) 
Main effects 
  
Product recall volume 0.0686 (0.069) 
Product recall initiation strategy -0.0078 (0.006) 
Brand advertising 0.0018 (0.005) 
Recalled model advertising -0.0129*** (0.004) 
Non-recalled model advertising 0.0051 (0.009) 
Promotional advertising 0.0011 (0.002) 
Moderating effects 
  
Product recall volume x Brand advertising (H1) -0.0171* (0.010) 
Product recall volume x Recalled model advertising 0.0035 (0.006) 
Product recall volume x Non-recalled model advertising 0.0065 (0.008) 
Product recall volume x Promotional advertising -0.0063* (0.003) 
Control variables 
  
Product reliability 0.0076 (0.005) 
Labor intensity 0.0158 (0.037) 
R&D intensity 0.0053 (0.026) 
Sales 0.0025 (0.013) 
Product scope -0.0003 (0.0004) 
Capital structure 0.0120 (0.048) 
Market to book ratio 0.0011 (0.010) 
Year trend 0.0008 (0.002) 
Endogeneity correction terms included Four correction terms significant 
R-squared 0.2305*** 
Sample Size: 185 
Dependent Variable:  CAR(-1; 1) 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
  
Notes: Robust standard-Errors corrected for clusterwise heteroscedasticity. The CAR is computed from the 
four-factor model. 
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TABLE 6. Results from Long-Term Calendar-Time Portfolio Analysis of Abnormal Returns 
 
  Main Effect Moderating Effect 
  
(H2) (H3) (H4) (H5a) (H5b) (H6) 
  
Advertising 
Support 
Advertising 
Support 
Advertising 
Support 
Post-Recall 
Preparation 
Post-recall 
Preparation 
No. of New Product 
Announcements  
 
All Firms 
Recall Volume x 
Brand 
Advertising 
Recall Initiation 
Strategy x Brand 
Advertising 
Recall Initiation 
Strategy x Recalled 
Model Advertising 
Preparation x 
Brand 
Advertising 
Preparation x 
Promotional 
Advertising 
Volume x No. of 
New Product 
Announcements 
Holding Period 
        
  
6 Months Alpha (%)         
   
OLS 0.0071*** 0.0080*** -0.0008 0.0026 0.0026 0.0044** 0.0052*** 
WLS 0.0077*** 0.0100*** -0.0012* 0.0027** 0.0022*** 0.0047*** 0.0054*** 
9 Months Alpha (%)               
OLS 0.0065*** 0.0070*** -0.0012 0.0039** 0.0031*** 0.0053*** 0.0040** 
WLS 0.0072*** 0.0081*** -0.0017*** 0.0039*** 0.0028*** 0.0049*** 0.0044*** 
12 Months Alpha (%)               
OLS 0.0066*** 0.0059*** -0.0011 0.0043** 0.0035*** 0.0059*** 0.0029** 
WLS 0.0075*** 0.0068*** -0.0022*** 0.0040*** 0.0029*** 0.0055*** 0.0034*** 
18 Months Alpha (%)               
OLS 0.0066*** 0.0058*** -0.0019 0.0038** 0.0039*** 0.0062*** 0.0028*** 
WLS 0.0078*** 0.0067*** -0.0029*** 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0055*** 0.0037*** 
24 Months Alpha (%)               
OLS 0.0059*** 0.0051*** -0.0014 0.0047*** 0.0043*** 0.0071*** 0.0021** 
WLS 0.0073*** 0.0061*** -0.0028*** 0.0034*** 0.0029*** 0.0059*** 0.0034*** 
Notes: This table shows the results of long-term abnormal returns using the calendar-time portfolio approach and test statistics for various periods  
 after the product recall announcement. The data are presented as monthly abnormal returns estimated using the four-factor model. 
  ***, **, * denote one-tail significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.         
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TABLE 7. Summary of Results 
 
  Short-term Returns Long-term Returns                     
Determinants  
Predicted 
effects 
Actual 
results 
Predicted 
effects 
Actual 
results 
Moderating effects 
    
Advertising x Product recall volume 
    
Product recall volume x Brand advertising ─ (H1) ─ + (H2) + 
Advertising x Product recall initiation strategy 
    
Product recall initiation strategy x Brand advertising N.A. N.A. ─ (H3) ─ 
Product recall initiation strategy x Recalled model advertising N.A. N.A. + (H4) + 
Post-recall preparation x Advertising 
    Post-recall preparation  x Brand advertising N.A. N.A. + (H5a) + 
Post-recall preparation  x Promotional advertising N.A. N.A. + (H5b) + 
New product announcement x Product recall volume N.A. N.A. + (H6) + 
Notes: N.A., not applicable;          
Hypotheses numbers are shown in parentheses. The effects of other variables are not shown to save space. 
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TABLE 8. Illustrative Research on the New Product Preannouncements on Shareholder Value 
 
Illustrative Studies 
Industry 
Sign of 
Innovation 
Effect 
Short-term 
Postevent 
Return 
Dependent Variable 
Product Recall 
Presence 
 
     
Chaney, Devinney, and Winer (1991) Multiple industries + 0.75% CAR(-1; 1) ── 
Zantout and Chaganti (1996) Multiple industries + 0.15% CAR(-1; 0) ── 
Hendricks and Singhal (1997) Multiple industries - -5.25% CAR(-1; 0) ── 
Lee at al. (2000) Multiple industries + 2.71% CAR(-1; 1) ── 
Mishra and Bhabra (2001) Multiple industries + 0.44% CAR(-1; 0) ── 
Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu (2003) Pharmaceuticals + ── NPV ── 
Bayus et al. (2003) Personal Computer + ── ROA, Asset Growth ── 
Pauwels et al. (2004) Automobile + 0.02% M-to-B Ratio ── 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007) Software/Hardware + Non-significant CAR(-2; 2) ── 
Srinivasan et al. (2009) Automobile + 0.07% Stock returns ── 
Sood & Tellis (2009) Technology + 0.50% CAR(-1; 1), Total Return ── 
This study Automobile Yes (+) Yes (0.52%) Yes: CAR(-1; 0) Yes 
          
 
Notes: "─" denotes that the effect is not investigated  
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TABLE 9. Example of New Product Preannouncement in the Presence of Product Recalls 
 
Automaker 
Announcement 
Date 
Excerpt from the Announcement 
Innovation 
Type 
Product recall 
presence (Volume) 
CAR[-1, 
0] (%) 
Source 
Chrysler, PT 
Cruiser 
1999-01-03 
The 2001 Chrysler PT Cruiser adds a new dimension to the Chrysler brand around the world by 
breaking the barriers of conventional automotive design and function. "Chrysler PT Cruiser 
dramatically changes the profile of the Chrysler brand by expanding the breadth of its product line 
and the presence of the brand around the world," said Robert J. Eaton, Chairman, DaimlerChrysler 
(NYSE: DCX)....Internationally, Chrysler PT Cruiser will reflect the individualism of consumers 
who are looking for a vehicle that is efficient for their daily transportation, while offering flexibility 
for their weekend and holiday travel requirements. 
New entry into 
the market 
Yes (170,000) -9.70% 
PR 
Newswire 
Acura, MDX 2000-01-11 
Acura introduced its vision for the next generation of sport utility vehicle with the MD-X 
concept SUV at the 2000 North American International Auto Show.  Featuring advanced 
technology and luxury amenities, the multi-dimensional MD-X concept offers performance and 
handling with off-road capability and utility.  "The MD-X concept is our interpretation of a no-
compromise vehicle with sports sedan performance and SUV functionality," said Dick Colliver, 
executive vice president, Acura division. "The MD-X closely reflects the direction and focus of our 
new SUV which goes on sale this fall."  
New entry into 
the market 
Yes (213,736) 0.65% 
PR 
Newswire 
Lincoln, 
Aviator 
2001-08-21 
Lincoln confirmed today in a meeting of its top dealers that the next all-new product in the 
transformation of the brand will be the 2003 Lincoln Aviator. "The Lincoln Aviator will bring 
together all of the elements we believe define American Luxury:  Balance and composure on the 
road, indulgent comfort and distinctive design," says Lincoln Mercury President Mark Hutchins. 
The 2003 Lincoln Aviator, which will go into production in the summer of 2002, will be a sport 
utility vehicle built on a 113.7-inch wheelbase, and it will have an advanced dual overhead cam, 
four-valve V-8 engine, a sophisticated four-wheel independent suspension and available all-wheel 
drive. It also will be an ultra-low emissions (ULEV) vehicle....Additional information on the 2003 
Lincoln Aviator, including photography, features and options, technical specifications and pricing 
will be released closer to the introduction of the vehicle.  
New entry into 
the market 
Yes (1,400,000) -7.27% 
PR 
Newswire 
Honda, 
Ridgeline 
2004-11-02 
Honda's all-new 4-door, 4WD truck will be named the "Ridgeline" when it goes on-sale at 
Honda dealerships nationwide in Spring 2005 as a 2006 model…."The growing market for 
aftermarket truck parts and accessories makes SEMA the perfect place to announce the Ridgeline 
name," said Dan Bonawitz, vice president in charge of corporate planning for American 
Honda.....The Ridgeline takes advantage of the industry's first fully integrated, closed-box frame 
with unibody construction to deliver superior ride, handling and packaging efficiency along with 
half-ton payload capacity and significantly stronger body rigidity versus traditional body-on-frame 
trucks....Complete details on the Ridgeline's innovative new approach to the truck market will be 
available at the 2005 North American International Auto Show in January. 
New entry into 
the market 
No (0) 1.28% 
PR 
Newswire 
Dodge, 
Challenger 
2007-02-14 
DaimlerChrysler announced today that the all-new 2008 Dodge Challenger will be built at its 
Brampton Assembly Plant near Toronto. "It's good news that the Dodge Challenger will be added 
to the Canadian production line-up," said Reid Bigland, President and CEO - DaimlerChrysler 
Canada. "Quickly bringing desirable new products such as the Dodge Challenger to market is 
critical to keeping our plants humming and our dealerships busy.".... The 2008 Dodge Challenger 
would be going into production in 2008. 
New entry into 
the market 
No (0) 7.40% 
PR 
Newswire 
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TABLE 10. Variables, Operationalization, and Data Sources  
 
Variable Reference Operationalization Data Source 
Dependent Variables 
   
Financial returns 
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 
(2009); Thirumalai and 
Shinha (2011) 
Short-term abnormal returns two days around the new product preannouncement date 
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
 
Fama and French (1993); 
Carhart (1997) 
Fama and French’s (1993) and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factors Ken French’s Web site 
Focal Independent Variables 
   
Product recall volume 
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 
(2009); Thirumalai and 
Shinha (2011) 
Sales revenue-weighted average of vehicles recalled by the preannouncing firm in the previous 
month 
NHTSA, LexisNexis, 
Automotive News Market 
Data Book 
Innovativeness 
Pauwels et al. (2004), 
Srinivasan et al. (2009) 
Single item measure on using a 0 to 5 scale, where 0 implies no visible vehicle change, 3 
implies major changes that affect exterior sheet metal and considerable change to interior, 5 
implies new entry into the market (e.g., 2001 Acura MDX). We only retain new product 
preannouncements that are equal or higher than level 3 in order to examine the impact of 
innovation level of each vehich that are significantly redesigned or new introduction.  
JDPA's Expert Rating 
Criteria, Consumer Report, 
Automotive News Market 
Data Book 
Advertising 
Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, 
and Eilert (2013); Liu and 
Shankar (2013) 
Log of monthly advertising expenditures on the preannouncing make (in thousand of dollars) Kantar Media 
Technology specificity Mishra and Bhabra (2001) 
1 if preannouncement contains information on the detailed technological improvement of the 
new product, 0 if otherwise 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
Recall initiation strategy 
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 
(2009) 
1 if firms initiate voluntary product recall and 0 if the recall was mandated by the government 
agency 
NHTSA, LexisNexis 
Recency of product recall This study 
The time lag between the firm's product recall announcement date and the firm's new product 
preannouncement date following the product recall announcement.  
LexisNexis, Factiva 
Product reliability 
Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, 
and Eilert (2013); Liu and 
Shankar (2013) 
Reliability ratings of the preannouncing model if the new product is already in the market,  
average of firm reliability ratings if otherwise 
Consumer Report, 
Automotive News Market 
Data Book 
Spokesperson 
Sorescu, Shankar, and 
Kushwaha (2007) 
1 if preannouncement was made by the chief executive officer or top menagement executive, 0 
if otherwise 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
Preannouncement specificity 
Sorescu, Shankar, and 
Kushwaha (2007) 
1 if preannouncement contains information on the price or time of introduction of the new 
product, 0 if otherwise 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
Targeting evidence This study 
1 if preannouncement contains information on the potential target consumer or target market of 
the new product, 0 if otherwise 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
Control Variables 
   
Sport sedan 
Balachander, Liu, and 
Stock (2009) 
1 if preannouncing new product is sport or two-door sedan, 0 if otherwise 
Ward's Automotive 
Yearbook 
SUV/Truck/Van/Wagon This study 1 if preannouncing new product is SUV, Truck, Van, or Wagon, 0 if otherwise 
Ward's Automotive 
Yearbook 
Hybrid vehicle This study 1 if preannouncing new product is hybrid vehicle, 0 if otherwise 
Ward's Automotive 
Yearbook 
Luxury vehicle 
Balachander, Liu, and 
Stock (2009) 
1 if preannouncing new product is luxury vehicle, 0 if otherwise 
Ward's Automotive 
Yearbook 
Sales 
Thirumalai and Sinha 
(2011);            
Kalaignanam et al. (2013) 
Log of monthly unit sales of the preannouncing make 
Automotive News Market 
Data Book 
Firm size 
Sorescu, Shankar, and 
Kushwaha (2007) 
Log of total asset (in millions of dollars) COMPUSTAT 
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Table 11. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  
  Variable M SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 CAR(-1;0) 0.01 0.03 -0.1 0.16 1 
                 
2 Innovation 4.26 0.75 3 5 0.05 1 
                
3 Advertising 8.78 1.66 0 11 0.02 
-
0.04 
1 
               
4 Product recall volume 0.64 0.9 0 4.5 
-
0.12 
-
0.05 
-
0.02 
1 
              
5 Recall recency 34.9 20.6 0 75 
-
0.11 
-
0.07 
-0.1 0.17 1 
             
6 
Recall initiation 
strategy 
0.52 0.5 0 1 0.03 0.05 
-
0.03 
0.16 0.19 1 
            
7 Recall severity 0.21 0.41 0 1 
-
0.04 
0.04 
-
0.07 
0.31 0.14 0.21 1 
           
8 Product reliability 2.67 0.88 1 5 0.02 0.04 
-
0.19 
0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03 1 
          
9 Technology specificity 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.15 0.05 
-
0.03 
-
0.05 
-
0.01 
-
0.11 
-
0.04 
-
0.08 
1 
         
10 Spokesperson 0.46 0.5 0 1 
-
0.05 
0.02 0.04 
-
0.05 
-
0.04 
0.04 0.04 
-
0.07 
0.15 1 
        
11 
Preannouncement 
specificity 
0.65 0.48 0 1 0.01 0.07 
-
0.01 
-
0.06 
0.08 0.06 0.06 0 0.12 0.04 1 
       
12 Targeting evidence 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.1 0.08 0.01 
-
0.02 
-
0.06 
0.05 0.09 
-
0.09 
0.33 0.34 0.15 1 
      
13 Sport sedan 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.06 0 
-
0.08 
-
0.09 
0.01 0.04 0 0.03 0 -0.1 
-
0.05 
0 1 
     
14 SUV/Truck/Van/Wagon 0.47 0.5 0 1 
-
0.06 
0.07 0.08 0.12 0 0 
-
0.04 
0 
-
0.04 
0.01 
-
0.05 
0.02 
-
0.28 
1 
    
15 Hybrid vehicle 0.04 0.21 0 1 
-
0.02 
0.03 0.12 
-
0.04 
-
0.17 
-
0.07 
-
0.06 
-
0.25 
-
0.03 
0.08 
-
0.07 
-
0.04 
-
0.07 
-
0.12 
1 
   
16 Luxury vehicle 0.34 0.48 0 1 0.04 
-
0.02 
-
0.35 
-
0.07 
0 0.07 0.07 
-
0.07 
0.18 0.06 0.02 0 
-
0.09 
-
0.15 
-
0.03 
1 
  
17 Sales 10.4 1.17 6.18 12.5 0.09 0.15 0.27 0.01 
-
0.11 
-
0.04 
-
0.21 
-
0.03 
-
0.01 
0.04 0.08 
-
0.17 
0 
-
0.08 
-
0.03 
-
0.35 
1 
 
18 Firm size 12.1 0.66 10.2 13.1 
-
0.06 
0.09 0.04 0.01 0.2 0.31 0.17 
-
0.01 
-
0.06 
-
0.01 
0.09 0.11 
-
0.01 
0.08 0.08 0.05 -0.1 1 
 
Note: N=247. 
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TABLE 12. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of New Product Preannouncement Across Different Event Windows 
 
  1. Market Model 2. Market-Adjusted Model 3. Fama-French Four-factor Model 
Window 
Mean abnormal 
return (%) 
% 
Positive 
Patell t-
statistica 
p-value 
Mean abnormal 
return (%) 
% 
Positive 
Patell t-
statistica 
p-value 
Mean abnormal 
return (%) 
% 
Positive 
CDA t-
statistica 
p-value 
[-1, 0] 0.47*** 55.51% 3.228 0.0012 0.47*** 55.13% 2.987 0.0028 0.52*** 56.92% 2.683 0.0073 
[0, +1] 0.23 56.27% 2.255 0.0242 0.17 55.13% 1.759 0.0785 0.30 55.73% 1.546 0.1222 
[-1, +1] 0.26 53.61% 1.900 0.0574 0.19 51.71% 1.351 0.1767 0.34 52.57% 1.432 0.1521 
[-1, +2] 0.22 49.81% 1.401 0.1613 0.16 51.71% 0.994 0.3203 0.24 49.01% 0.885 0.3764 
[-2, +1] 0.24 53.99% 1.808 0.0706 0.17 49.05% 1.358 0.1746 0.29 52.57% 1.034 0.3009 
[-2, +2] 0.20 48.67% 1.398 0.1621 0.15 48.67% 1.057 0.2906 0.19 50.20% 0.607 0.5438 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. 
          aPatell t-statistic is adjusted for cross-sectional 
variance. 
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TABLE 13. Cross-Sectional Abnormal Returns Around New Product Preannouncement Date 
  
  
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Dependent variables: CAR[-1; 0] 
Hypothesized 
Effect 
 M1: Main 
 M2: 
Uncorrected 
 M3: With 
2SLS 
Intercept 
 
-0.0355 -0.0402 -0.0586* 
Main effects 
    
Innovativeness 
 
0.0013 0.0016 0.0009 
Advertising(t-1) 
 
0.0004 0.0004 -0.0042 
Product recall volume H1: θ1<0 -0.0091** -0.0008* -0.0012* 
Recall recency  
 
-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
Recall initiation strategy 
 
0.008 0.0086* 0.0093*** 
Recall severity  
 
0.002 0.0033 0.0038 
Product reliability 
 
0.0008 0.0008 -0.0005 
Technology specificity 
 
0.0143** 0.0135** 0.0134*** 
Preannouncement specificity 
 
-0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0014 
Targeting evidence 
 
0.0014 0.0016 0.0015 
Spokesperson 
 
-0.0103* -0.0101* -0.0099** 
Moderating effects 
    
Product recall volume*Innovativeness H2: θ2<0 
 
-0.0100** -0.0109*** 
Product recall volume*Advertising(t-1) H3: θ3>0 
 
0.0062** 0.0060*** 
Product recall volume*Technology H4: θ4>0 
 
0.0037* 0.0041 
Control variables 
    
Sport sedan 
 
0.0049 0.0043 0.0016 
SUV/Truck/Van/Wagon vehicle 
 
-0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0003 
Hybrid vehicle 
 
-0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0005 
Luxury vehicle 
 
0.0051 0.0061 0.0018 
Sales 
 
0.0035 0.0042 0.0059* 
Firm size 
 
-0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0022 
Year fixed effects   
Two year 
dummies 
significant 
Three year 
dummies 
significant 
Nine year 
dummies 
significant 
R-squared   0.136*** 0.156*** 0.168*** 
Notes: N=247. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
      
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
    
 
 
